










Which should prevail—the Take Care Clause of Article II or the 
Due Process Clause? To Justice Breyer’s chagrin, the majorities in 
Lucia v. SEC and Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB expressly declined 
to resolve whether the U.S. Constitution condones SEC administrative 
law judges’ and other similarly situated agency adjudicators’ current 
statutory protection from at-will removal. The crux of the problem is 
that, on one hand, senior officials may use at-will removal to pressure 
agency adjudicators and thereby potentially imperil the impartiality 
that due process requires. On the other hand, Article II limits 
Congress’s ability to cocoon executive officers, including potentially 
agency adjudicators, from at-will removal. 
This Article argues that the executive branch itself can and should 
moot or mitigate this constitutional clash. Nothing in Article II prevents 
the president from issuing executive orders and agencies from 
promulgating regulations—collectively, what I refer to as “impartiality 
regulations”—that require good cause for disciplining and removing 
agency adjudicators, as well as other means of protecting adjudicator 
impartiality. Indeed, the executive branch has a long-standing yet 
overlooked practice of using executive orders and regulations for 
similar purposes. Impartiality regulations are but one form of the 
executive branch’s internal separation of powers. Such self-imposed 
separation provides a strong theoretical and practical solution for the 
agency-adjudicator dilemma. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has diligently ignored answering a problem of 
its own making: Is the current statutory insulation that federal 
administrative adjudicators have from at-will removal constitutional? 
The answer proves elusive because it requires untangling the Court’s 
interpretations of at least two competing constitutional provisions— 
the Due Process and Take Care Clauses.1 
1. Because the Supreme Court has also indicated that a federal official’s status as an officer 
or employee may affect how much oversight the president must have over that official, the 
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The problem arose in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board2 in 2010.3 In that decision, the Court 
considered whether Congress could cocoon members of the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) within two levels 
of protection from at-will removal. One level directly protected the 
PCAOB members from at-will removal by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”), while a second level protected the SEC 
commissioners from the president’s at-will removal.4 The Court held 
that dual for-cause provisions impermissibly limited the president’s 
oversight of administrative officials.5 The dissenting Justices noted 
that, among numerous other examples within the federal bureaucracy, 
the federal government’s now nearly two thousand “administrative law 
judges” (“ALJs”)6 enjoyed dual-cause protection, and the dissenters 
suggested that ALJs’ protection would be unconstitutional under the 
majority’s holding.7 The majority suggested in response that ALJs’ dual 
for-cause insulation may be constitutional because of their status as 
employees—not “inferior officers” of the United States—or 
adjudicators.8 
Yet only eight years later in Lucia v. SEC,9 the Court held that the 
SEC’s ALJs were indeed “inferior officers” because of their trial-
judge-like powers.10 Despite appearing to bring ALJs’ insulation within 
the reach of Free Enterprise Fund, the Court again punted on the 
constitutionality of ALJs’ insulation,11 over Justice Breyer’s and the 
government’s objections.12 Lucia’s holding that ALJs are officers of the 
United States does more than set aside a possible justification for 
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010) (noting that 
administrative law judges’ status as “Officers of the United States” is disputed, and thus they may 
be able to have dual for-cause provisions to protect them from at-will removal if they are merely 
employees). 
2. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
3. Id. at 483–84.
 4. See id. at 486–87 (describing express and implicit removal provisions). 
5. Id. at 484–98. 
6. See  OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT, ALJS BY AGENCY, https://www.opm.gov/services-for-
agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/3B6C-95AC] (listing 
1,931 ALJs as of March 2017). 
7. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 542–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
8. See id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion). 
9. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
 10. See id. at 2053–54 (2018) (explaining why the SEC ALJs were “inferior officers” under 
the Court’s earlier decision in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)).
 11. Id. at 2050 n.1. 
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ALJs’ insulation. It also calls into question the constitutionality of at 
least some of the significantly more numerous, yet often forgotten, 
cadre of non-ALJ adjudicators that perform ALJ-like functions and 
have similar double insulation from at-will removal.13 These non-ALJ 
adjudicators include immigration judges, administrative judges, and 
other adjudicators with various titles. 
Why has the Court been so hesitant to address agency 
adjudicators’ dual for-cause protection from at-will removal? The 
answer likely lies in the tension between two constitutional 
provisions.14 After Free Enterprise Fund, the first provision—the Take 
Care Clause—limits all or certain inferior officers to only one level of 
“good cause” protection from removal or discipline between them and 
the president in the executive-branch hierarchy.15 Two or even three 
layers of “good cause” protection insulate ALJs: one for them, one for 
the independent agency that reviews their removals, and sometimes
one for the head of the ALJs’ employing department.16 ALJs’ 
insulation thus appears to offend Article II. 
Direct at-will removal of ALJs, however, likely undermines ALJs’ 
objective appearance of impartiality because department heads can 
hold the subtle threat of discipline or removal over ALJs to encourage 
them to favor agency positions.17 Another constitutional provision— 
the Due Process Clause—requires impartiality for agency 
adjudication,18 but whether impartiality entails protection from at-will 
removal is less clear. In short, Congress may be damned if it insulates 
agency adjudicators and damned if it does not. 
 13. See generally Kent Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. 515 (2019) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer] (discussing the functions of non-ALJ 
adjudicators and their reported numbers). 
 14. See generally Kent Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAND. L. REV. 797 (2013) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary] (referring to the tension over insulating ALJs 
from at-will removal between Free Enterprise Fund and Lucia as the “ALJ quandary”). 
 15. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 496–97 (2010) (invalidating the second of 
two good-cause statutory protections for PCAOB members to ensure sufficient presidential 
oversight under the Take Care Clause). 
 16. See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 14, at 807 (“Agencies may remove 
and generally discipline ALJs only for ‘good cause established and determined by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board’ [(“MSPB”)] after a formal administrative hearing. The MSPB 
members, like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can remove them ‘only 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018))). 
 17. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 493 (“[O]ne who holds his office only during the 
pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against 
the latter’s will.” (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935))). 
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Scholars and regulated parties have taken note. Two prominent 
scholars, for instance, have recently called for doctrinal modification in 
light of the collision between the two provisions.19 Regulated parties 
have also challenged ALJs’ insulation. Although early district court 
challenges proved unsuccessful,20 the Fifth Circuit recently considered 
the issue so significant that it took the extraordinary step of enjoining 
an adjudication before an SEC ALJ until after the court had resolved 
the constitutionality of the ALJ’s protection from at-will removal.21 
Solutions to this problem may prove difficult. On the one hand, 
striking down agency adjudicators’ immediate statutory protection 
from at-will removal will only undermine their appearance of 
impartiality because the supervising official can now remove 
adjudicators at will. On the other hand, removing the second layer of 
“good cause” protection shielding adjudicators’ heads of department 
or the agency that reviews adverse action against adjudicators would 
be a significantly disruptive remedy. Such action might undermine 
independent regulatory agencies altogether22 or subvert the entire civil 
service model that has been in place for more than four decades.23 
A more functional approach to the president’s removal power 
could account for due process concerns in the context of agency 
adjudication and thereby permit adjudicators’ protection from at-will 
removal.24 But the Supreme Court has taken a formalist approach to 
 19. See generally, e.g., Linda D. Jellum, “You’re Fired!” Why the ALJ Multi-Track Dual 
Removal Provisions Violate the Constitution and Possible Fixes, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 705
(2019) (calling for, among other things, a more wholesale overruling of the Court’s removal-power 
jurisprudence); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Court Should Change the Scope of the Removal Power 
by Adopting a Pure Functional Approach, 26 GEO.MASON L. REV. 657 (2019). 
 20. See infra note 83 for a list of challenges to ALJs’ insulation from at-will removal. 
21. Cochran v. SEC, No. 19-10396 (5th Cir. Sept. 25, 2019) (order granting preliminary 
injunction); see also Peter Rasmussen, Analysis: Lack of Removal Power Could Threaten SEC 
ALJ Regime, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 7, 2019, 6:48 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-lack-of-removal-power-could-
threaten-sec-alj-regime [https://perma.cc/5XRL-CL59] (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s injunction 
and its implications). 
 22. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 502 (discussing precedent concerning good-cause 
provisions). 
 23. See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service 
Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 961 (1976) (noting that by the Nixon administration, “[t]he 
right of every civil servant to an outside appraisal of the grounds for dismissal has thus recently 
replaced the historic emphasis on executive discretion”).
 24. See generally Pierce, supra note 19 (calling for courts to adopt a functional approach 
when defining the scope of the removal power). 
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their recent removal-power jurisprudence.25 Other solutions—such as 
permitting the D.C. Circuit to appoint agency adjudicators as an 
interbranch appointment—may prove politically infeasible.26 
This Article proposes an executive-branch solution that avoids 
constitutional fisticuffs between competing provisions, as well as 
complicated legislative responses. Namely, the White House and 
agencies should use executive orders and regulations to mimic and 
improve administrative adjudicators’ existing statutory protections 
from at-will removal. I refer to these orders and regulations collectively 
as “impartiality regulations.” 
These regulations are one example of what scholars term “internal 
separation of powers”: internal executive-branch action that furthers 
other constitutional or policy objectives.27 The key benefits of internal 
separation of powers, like those proposed here, are that they permit 
the executive to fashion separation in useful ways that address specific, 
nuanced problems—such as the impartiality of adjudicators within the 
omnibus civil service—without offending the constitutional separation 
of powers among the branches. To be sure, an internally focused 
executive regulatory scheme may lack the long-term stability of a 
similar statutory scheme, but it is attractive as a second-best response 
to mitigate or moot any political impasse or judicial disruption to the 
existing insulation for adjudicators. In fact, impartiality regulations can 
go beyond at-will removal to improve the impartiality of agency 
adjudication, for example, by prohibiting ex parte contacts and limiting 
how agencies go about awarding pay bonuses to adjudicators. In other 
words, whether or not the Supreme Court places ALJs outside of Free 
Enterprise’s tiered-removal prohibition, impartiality regulations are a 
useful device for legitimizing and ameliorating agency adjudication. 
Impartiality regulations do not undermine the president’s 
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”28 The 
Take Care Clause requires the executive to ensure agency adjudicators 
are impartial under the Due Process Clause as much as it requires the 
 25. See Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 675– 
76, 710–14 (2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Standing For] (discussing the Roberts Court’s consistently 
formalist approach to separation of powers, including the president’s removal power under 
Article II, and calling for a more functional approach). 
 26. See Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, supra note 14, at 832–35 (proposing that the 
D.C. Circuit appoint and remove ALJs to protect ALJ impartiality without implicating Free 
Enterprise Fund’s dual for-cause prohibition). 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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executive to enforce regulatory statutes faithfully in a manner that does 
not violate other constitutional rights. Control and insulation are both 
useful, if not necessary, tools for executive enforcement. And even in 
the absence of constitutional imperatives, impartiality and tiered 
insulation for adjudicators inure to the benefit of not only regulated 
parties but also agencies themselves by giving executive action more 
legitimacy. The executive’s provision of civil service protections during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries strongly suggests that the 
executive recognizes the long-term benefits of insulating executive 
officials. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the agency-
adjudicator dilemma (i.e., the dilemma of insulating adjudicators from 
at-will removal in a way that protects their impartiality without 
offending the president’s supervisory power under Article II), how it 
developed, and some of the potential, but lacking, solutions. Part II 
reviews the theoretical grounding of internal separation of powers and 
its current uses. It then discusses the executive branch’s long-standing 
use of executive orders to protect executive officials from at-will 
removal. Part III details how the executive branch should go about 
resolving the agency-adjudicator dilemma via impartiality regulations. 
Specifically, this Part proposes creating impartiality regulations to 
address the removal, hiring, and other indicia of impartiality for agency 
adjudicators. Finally, Part III considers potential obstacles to the 
promulgation of impartiality regulations, including hostility or 
disinterest from current or future administrations. Ultimately, 
impartiality regulations indicate that the executive is not simply at the 
mercy of Congress or judicial doctrine. The executive has, if you will, 
its own agency in improving its supervision and insulation of agency 
adjudicators. 
I. THE AGENCY-ADJUDICATOR DILEMMA
The dilemma over administrative-adjudicator insulation boils 
down to how to balance political and managerial control or supervision 
with impartiality. For instance, the Trump administration has sought to 
impose significant case-processing goals on immigration judges to 
ensure prompt adjudication. The immigration judges, for their part, 
contend that the goals are unrealistic and improperly encourage them 
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administration’s expressed preference.29 This Part considers how 
dilemmas like this arise under the Take Care and Due Process Clauses 
by considering each clause’s development, how the Court has sought 
to avoid resolving the dilemma, and previously proposed solutions.
This agency-adjudicator dilemma has come to encompass two 
similar, but distinct, groups of federal adjudicators. The first are ALJs, 
who number around two thousand.30 ALJs were created by the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”) to preside over “on 
the record” agency hearings.31 As discussed in more detail in later 
parts, the APA requires ALJs to be “impartial” and limits their duties, 
ex parte contacts, and agency supervision.32 Until recently, agencies 
selected ALJs under a merit-based process led by the Office of 
Personnel Management (“OPM”) that limited agencies to hiring one 
of the three top-scoring candidates.33 A recent executive order, 
however, has removed ALJs from the “competitive service” and 
permitted direct agency hiring.34 Agencies can take adverse actions, as 
defined by statute, against ALJs “only for good cause established and 
determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board [(“MSPB”)] on the 
record after opportunity for hearing.”35 ALJs cannot receive 
performance reviews or bonuses.36 
Lacking any uniform title, the second group of adjudicators is 
often collectively, if inelegantly, styled as simply “non-ALJ 
adjudicators” or “non-ALJs” for short. Although difficult to define,37 
 29. See Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer, supra note 13, at 517–18 (discussing the 
current debate over the supervision of immigration judges). 
 30. See OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., supra note 6 (listing 1,931 ALJs). 
 31. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(a)–(b) (2018) (discussing on-the-record hearings). 
 32. See infra Part III. 
 33. See Kent Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1643, 1654–55 
(2016) [hereinafter Barnett, Against Administrative Judges] (describing the long-standing ALJ-
hiring process). 
34. Exec. Order No. 13,843, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,755 (July 10, 2018). For additional thoughts on 
the executive order and changes to ALJ hiring, see Kent Barnett, Raiding the OPM Den: The 
New Method of ALJ Hiring, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 11, 2018), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/raiding-the-opm-den-the-new-method-of-alj-hiring-by-kent-barnett
[https://perma.cc/L6Q6-PV73]. Senators Maria Cantwell and Susan Collins have introduced a bill 
to largely restore and codify the traditional OPM-led ALJ-hiring process. ALJ Competitive 
Service Restoration Act, S. 2348, 116th Cong. (2019). 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a)–(b) (2018). 
 36. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1655–56 (discussing 
limitations on supervising or rewarding ALJs). 
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they number more than ten thousand under broad definitions.38 One 
empirical study has determined that of 432 federal adjudicatory 
schemes, 103 are presided over by ALJs, while 230 are presided over 
by non-ALJ adjudicators.39 Non-ALJ adjudicators go by many titles, 
including hearing officer, administrative judge, or immigration judge.40 
They may or may not be created by statute,41 and no uniform provisions 
govern their impartiality and job performance. They are hired from 
within and from outside the agency. They are usually subject to 
performance reviews and eligible for bonuses. They can be removed or 
disciplined only for cause with review by the MSPB. Unlike with ALJs, 
the MSPB does not itself initially determine whether cause exists to 
discipline or remove non-ALJ adjudicators.42 
A. Due Process 
Due process requires that all adjudicators—whether judicial or 
administrative and whether in federal or state proceedings—be 
impartial.43 Because partiality can be extremely difficult to prove, 
partiality inquiries nearly always concern the objective risk, 
probability, potential, or appearance of partiality.44 Creating an 
appearance of impartiality serves as a prophylaxis for limiting 
unconscious partiality and thus for achieving actual impartiality.45 
38. Kent Barnett & Russell Wheeler, Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status, 
Selection, Oversight, and Removal, 53 GA. L. REV. 1, 33–34 fig.1 (2019). 
 39. Schemes, ADJUDICATION RESEARCH, https://acus.law.stanford.edu/schemes 
[https://perma.cc/PD4F-S2C9] (sorting by Type A for schemes presided over by ALJs and Type 
B for those presided over by non-ALJs). 
 40. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1659–60; Barnett & 
Wheeler, supra note 38, at 37–38 fig.3 (listing the numerous reported titles for non-ALJ 
adjudicators). 
 41. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1659.
42. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, for an in-depth discussion over their 
indicia of impartiality. Compare 5 C.F.R. § 1201.2 (noting MSPB’s original jurisdiction extends to 
actions against ALJs), id. § 1201.137 (noting that agencies must file complaints with the MSPB to 
take a proposed adverse action against ALJs), and id. § 1201.140 (2019) (noting that MSPB 
permits adverse action against an ALJ only if the MSPB finds “good cause”), with id. § 1201.21 
(noting MSPB hears appeals from employees against whom agencies have taken adverse action).
43. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 195 (1982). 
 44. See Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1671–73; see also generally
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016) (referring to the “appearance of 
neutrality”); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884, 886, 887 (2009) (describing the 
appropriate standard as one of probability, risk, and potential).
 45. See Dmitry Bam, Making Appearances Matter: Recusal and the Appearance of Bias, 2011 
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Which circumstances create the risk or appearance of partiality 
are far from clear, although the Supreme Court has recently identified 
new factors to consider. The Supreme Court has indicated that the 
following can serve as indicia of partiality: substantial contributions for 
judicial elections;46 remuneration or other “direct, personal, 
substantial, pecuniary interest” tied to judicial decisions;47 a current 
judge’s prior involvement in a case as counsel for a party;48 and certain 
relationships between judges and parties or their counsel.49 Perhaps 
most relevant for administrative adjudicators, the Court has 
reemphasized in the Article II context that “one who holds his office 
only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to 
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”50 
Nevertheless, the Court has never ruled directly on agencies’ ability to 
remove, discipline, or reward their adjudicators or indicated whether 
any particular limitations on these actions exist. 
Yet even from the Supreme Court’s rough sketch of due process’s 
requirements, the concerns over agencies or the president removing 
administrative adjudicators at will is obvious. If agency superiors can 
remove adjudicators at will—or, as is the case with certain non-ALJ 
adjudicators, can award them bonuses51—then the agency superiors 
can exert pressure on the adjudicators to rule in agency-friendly ways. 
This concern is most pronounced in enforcement proceedings when, as 
is often the case, the agency is a party.52 But even when the agency is 
 46. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 884.
47. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 48. Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905.
49. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 197 n.11 (1982). 
50. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). In fact, when interpreting a statute that permitted the 
adjudication of war claims before a commission, the Court inferred that Congress intended for 
the commissioners to have protection from at-will removal: 
If, as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act precluded the President from
influencing the Commission in passing on a particular claim, a fortiori must it be 
inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang over the Commission the Damocles’ 
sword of removal by the President for no reason other than that he preferred to have 
on that Commission men of his own choosing. 
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958). 
 51. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 73–83 (discussing reported non-ALJ 
adjudicators who are eligible and receive bonuses from their agencies). 
 52. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248 
(1946), reprinted in COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 262 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEG. HISTORY] (noting that 
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not a party, the agency may have preferences that it subtly seeks to 
impose on adjudicators. Indeed, even those who adhere to strong 
executive-power theories of presidential authority often recognize the 
problem with permitting the president or agency superiors to instruct 
agency adjudicators on how to rule.53 
Yet due process impartiality principles must have some kind of 
exception or slack for administrative adjudication or else they would 
cease to exist in their current form. Under general administrative law 
principles, the head of an agency can reverse an agency adjudicator’s 
decision in toto and can even hear adjudications in the first instance.54 
Because numerous heads of agencies—including all Cabinet-level 
heads—can be removed by the president at will and hear or review 
adjudications, any absolute impartiality rule that required insulation 
from at-will removal would entirely destabilize agency adjudication in 
existing nonindependent executive agencies. In effect, adjudications 
for such agencies would violate due process unless Congress acted to 
provide protection from the president’s at-will removal. The fact that 
agency adjudication by agency officials subject to at-will removal goes 
back to the Founding severely undercuts, or at least complicates, a 
broad application of due process to all agency officials.55 
The need for such a significant impartiality exception only arose 
after the Court expanded the reach of due process.56 Traditionally, due 
process applied only to the deprivation of one’s “right” to life, liberty, 
 53. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing 
the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 233–34 (1998) 
(“[E]ven the most ardent presidentialists have been careful to insist that the Chief Executive 
could not intervene to direct the outcome of particular cases.”). 
 54. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2018) (permitting “the agency,” “one or more members of the 
body which comprises the agency,” or an ALJ to take evidence); id. § 557(b) (confirming that 
“the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision” when reviewing 
decisions); Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency 
Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141, 143–44 (2019) (noting that the traditional model of federal 
agency adjudication leaves decision-making authority with the agency head).  
 55. Cf. James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of 
Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 
ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 73–74 (2012) (discussing the adjudicatory system concerning benefits for 
Revolutionary War veterans and their widows, and the Supreme Court’s constitutional and 
pragmatic concerns with judicial involvement in benefits adjudication run by the Secretary of 
War).  
 56. Cf. Jennifer L. Mascott, Constitutionally Conforming Agency Adjudication, 2 LOY. J.
REG. COMP. 22, 42–51 (2017) (arguing for a more limited sphere of appropriate agency 
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or property—not the awarding or revocation of benefits or privileges.57 
Until the early twentieth century, nearly all federal administrative 
action concerned benefits or privileges.58 Relevant deprivations would 
occur only with judicial process, as due process included one’s right to 
Article III courts.59 But due process’s reach expanded significantly in 
the twentieth century. Regulatory enforcement grew60 as judicial 
review shrank.61 And perhaps most importantly, the Court reconceived 
protected “property” interests to include “legitimate claim[s] of 
entitlement” to what would have been traditionally characterized as 
benefits and privileges.62 Without these developments, due process— 
and especially its impartiality prong—may have reached very little 
administrative adjudication. 
Nonetheless, before due process’s expanded reach to government 
benefits, Congress and agencies recognized the relationship between 
financial incentives and the impartiality of agency and judicial 
adjudication. When an agency or other federal officials received what 
Professor Nicholas Parrillo refers to as “facilitative payments”— 
payments from those needing a government benefit or service63—they 
skirted required factual findings or other legislative limitations when 
adjudicating matters related to citizenship, veterans’ benefits, and 
federal land. By doing so, they encouraged lucrative payments from 
future applicants. Congress, in response, moved these decisions to 
salaried officials and prohibited those officials from accepting 
facilitative payments. Notably, Congress recognized that an 
adjudicator’s incentive to continue or increase his income could 
influence decision-making, even if Congress had not tied the 
 57. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates 
for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1650–51 (1992). 
 58. See Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From Murray’s 
Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L.REV. 765, 798, 819 (1986) (discussing the expansion 
of the concept of “public rights” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). 
 59. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1720, 1802–03 (2012) (stating that “Article III limited the range of cases in 
which Congress could violate due process by exercising quasi-judicial power” while recognizing 
the open question of “whether the Due Process Clause . . . still requires that some traditional core 
of cases be decided in court, rather than in executive-branch agencies”). 
 60. See Young, supra note 58, at 819–23 (discussing a shift to increased administrative 
enforcement). 
 61. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46–50 (1932) (discussing the permissibility of 
deferential review to agency fact finding even in matters between private parties).
62. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 63. NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION 
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adjudicator’s pay to how he ruled in any particular case.64 The key 
difference between concerns then and now is not the nature of the 
incentive but whom the financial incentives benefit. Then, the 
individual who approached the agency paid the fee and stood to 
benefit. Now, the agency—often a party to agency adjudication and 
empowered to review, pay bonuses to, and take adverse action against 
the adjudicator—stands to influence the adjudicator. 
Where does this discussion of impartiality leave us? Due process’s 
impartiality requirements apply to agency adjudication; the Court 
recognizes the relationship between impartiality and at-will removal 
and financial incentives; and due process most likely softens or mutes 
the binary quality of impartiality’s reach to some agency adjudicators— 
namely, the heads of agencies. From this, one might conclude that 
Congress has significant authority to regulate presidential supervision 
of agency adjudicators, even if the Due Process Clause does not 
mandate any particular resolution of the tensions within the Supreme 
Court’s due process jurisprudence. 
B. The Take Care Clause 
The Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II complicate 
matters, however. Many leading scholars and jurists think Congress, in 
the well-known “Decision of 1789,” decided that the Constitution 
permitted the president to remove executive officers alone, even 
without impeachment proceedings.65 James Madison argued that 
removal by the president alone encourages executive officials to be 
more faithful and prompt in discharging their duties.66 Similar concerns 
continue today, as governmental supervisors often complain of their 
inability to discipline or remove “nonproductive or insubordinate 
employees.”67 
 64. See id. at 19–23, 125–79 (discussing key examples of the problems with facilitative 
payments and Congress’s response). 
 65. See generally Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L.
REV. 1021, 1022–26 (2006) (describing the nature of the debate and its contested meaning to 
scholars and jurists). Others have argued that its meaning is ambiguous. See id. at 1023–25 
(discussing the views of scholars Edward Corwin and David Currie, and Justice Louis Brandeis 
in dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
 66. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495, 499 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James 
Madison). 
 67. Frug, supra note 23, at 945 (quoting JOHN W. MACY, PUBLIC SERVICE: THE HUMAN 
SIDE OF GOVERNMENT 20 (1971)). Moreover, as Professor Frug suggests, a good-cause limitation 
can prove problematic in practice, even if not in theory. Id. at 946. One of the practical problems 
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Over time, the Court recognized that Article II permits certain 
congressionally imposed limitations on removal. In brief, Congress can 
limit at-will removal of inferior officers appointed by department 
heads68 or by a court of law,69 and Senate-confirmed principal officers.70 
The Court has even gone so far as to interpret a statute, despite its 
silence on the matter, as requiring good-cause removal for certain 
principal officers with only adjudicatory duties.71 Moreover, the Civil 
Service Act of 1978 prohibits at-will removal for the federal civil 
service,72 and I am unaware of any challenge under Article II to that 
statutory scheme. These decisions suggest that statutory limitations on 
agency adjudicators’ at-will removal—whether or not compelled by 
due process—are permissible under Article II, especially for the 
numerous inferior officers or employees. 
Then along came Free Enterprise Fund. There, the Court 
considered whether the good-cause removal protections for the 
PCAOB members violated Article II. Under the Board’s 
implementing statute, the SEC could appoint members for staggered 
five-year terms73 and could remove them for only extremely limited 
causes.74 Based on the parties’ agreement, the Court assumed that, 
permits removal for only “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” E.g., 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5491(c)(3) (2012). In a recent case, judges on the en banc D.C. Circuit jousted over whether the 
president could remove officers with such good-cause protection for mere policy disagreements. 
Compare PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 122–24 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring) 
(“Such a capacious construction would essentially remove the concept of ‘independence’ from 
‘independent agencies.’”), with id. at 134–35, 136–37 (Griffin, J., concurring) (“[T]hese removal 
grounds . . . provide only a minimal restriction on the President’s removal power, even permitting 
him to remove the Director for ineffective policy choices.”). Notably, the Supreme Court had 
earlier stated that its precedents would not suggest that a president could remove an officer over 
mere policy disagreements. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010) (“[T]he 
Government does not contend that simple disagreement with the Board’s policies or priorities 
could constitute ‘good cause’ for its removal. . . . Nor do our precedents suggest as much.”). 
 68. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (upholding the Secretary of the 
Navy’s ability to remove a cadet engineer only through court martial). 
 69. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92 (1988) (upholding good-cause removal for 
a special counsel appointed by the Special Division of the D.C. Circuit).
 70. See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding limitations 
on at-will removal of a Federal Trade commissioner). 
 71. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353–54 (1958) (interpreting a statute to permit 
only for-cause removal of War Claims commissioners).  
 72. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018). The statutory scheme also provides for administrative 
appeal to the MSPB and judicial review of the MSPB’s order. See id. §§ 7701(a), 7703(a). 
73. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010). 
 74. Id. at 486. The SEC could remove the PCAOB members after a formal hearing for the 
willful violation of certain laws, the willful abuse of authority, and unreasonable failure to enforce 
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despite congressional silence, the president could remove the SEC 
commissioners only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance 
in office.”75 The Court held that Congress’s cocooning of the PCAOB 
members within two “tiers” of protection from the president violated 
the Vesting and Take Care Clauses of Article II.76 Although the Court 
had earlier upheld protection from at-will removal for both principal 
officers like the SEC commissioners and inferior officers appointed by 
a department head like the PCAOB members, the Court held that the 
two otherwise permissible tiers were unconstitutional when combined. 
The problem was that the president could not hold the SEC 
accountable for its oversight of the PCAOB as he could for all of its 
other actions. Because neither the president nor anyone under his 
direct control had full authority over the PCAOB, Congress had 
dispersed responsibility for government action throughout the 
administrative state and insulated the president from political 
accountability for executive actions.77 
The dissenting Justices identified many officials and statutory 
schemes with tiered protections from at-will removal that the 
majority’s decision threatened. They included umpteen Senior 
Executive Service members in the civil service (including numerous 
senior leaders in scientific agencies), military personnel, much of the 
federal civil service,78 and—most importantly for my purposes— 
administrative law judges.79 Recall that agencies can remove or 
otherwise take adverse action against ALJs “only for good cause 
established and determined by the [MSPB] on the record after 
opportunity for hearing.”80 The MSPB’s members, who are appointed 
to seven-year terms following Senate confirmation, are also protected 
from at-will removal.81 A small number of non-ALJ adjudicators have 
the same statutory protection as ALJs from at-will removal.82 
 75. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620).
 76. Id. at 484. 
 77. See id. at 496–97. 
 78. See id. at 538–42, 543–44 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 79. See id. at 542–43. 
80. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018). 
 81. Id. § 1202(a), (d). 
 82. See 41 U.S.C. § 7105(b)(3) (2012) (“Members of the Civilian Board are subject to 
removal in the same manner as administrative law judges, as provided in section 7521 of title 5.”). 
There are currently fourteen judges on the U.S. Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. See Judges, 
U.S. CIVILIAN BD. OF CONTRACT APPEALS, https://www.cbca.gov/board/judges.html 
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Numerous litigants have taken notice and asserted Article II removal-
based challenges against ALJs.83 
Nearly all other non-ALJ agency adjudicators are in a similar, 
although not identical, state as ALJs. Civil service protections shelter 
non-ALJ adjudicators from at-will removal.84 But their protection from 
removal is not as robust as the protection for ALJs.85 Although the 
MSPB reviews adverse actions against civil servants by their employing 
agencies86 and requires a rational basis or substantial evidence for the 
action,87 the MSPB does not determine whether cause for the adverse 
action exists in the first instance.88 If the MSPB’s more limited review 
somehow does not bring the civil service—including non-ALJ 
adjudicators—within Free Enterprise Fund’s prohibition, many non-
ALJ adjudicators work for independent agencies whose head the 
 83. See Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th Cir. 2015); Cochran v. SEC, No. 4:19-CV-066-
A, 2019 WL 1359252, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2019); Morris & Dickson Co. v. Whitaker, 360 F. 
Supp. 3d 434, 437 (W.D. La. 2018); Bennett v. SEC, 151 F. Supp. 3d 632, 634 (D. Md. 2015), aff’d,
844 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2016); Tilton v. SEC, No. 15–CV–2472, 2015 WL 4006165, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 30, 2015), aff’d, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016); Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015), vacated and remanded by 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 3d 
382, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated by Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016). 
84. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2018) (“Under regulations prescribed by [OPM], an agency may take 
an action covered by this subchapter against an employee only for such cause as will promote the 
efficiency of the service.”). 
85. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1333 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Section 
7513 [the provisions of protection for removal for the civil service] contains a lower threshold to 
support removal than does § 7521 [the provision that protects ALJs from removal].”). The 
Federal Circuit, however, declined to consider the “circumstances which could justify a removal 
for such cause as would promote the efficiency of service.” Id. at 1333 n.5. 
86. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(d). 
 87. See Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1012 (4th Cir. 1978) (noting that courts applied 
either the rational-basis or substantial-evidence standards). 
 88. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (referring to the MSPB’s ability to determine and establish 
whether good cause exists), with id. § 7513(a), (d) (permitting an agency itself to take action and 
later appeal). The legislative history expands further on the merits of securing greater 
independence for ALJs in this context:
Recognizing that the entire tradition of the Civil Service Commission is directed 
toward security of tenure, it seems wise to put that tradition to use in the present case. 
However, additional powers are conferred upon the Commission. It must afford any 
examiner an opportunity for a hearing before acceding to an agency request for 
removal, and even then its action would be subject to judicial review.
S. REP.NO. 752 (1946), reprinted inAPALEG.HISTORY, supra note 52, at 29. Accord H.REP.NO.
1980 (1946), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 280. During the House 
proceedings on the APA, Representative Francis Walter noted that the ALJs’ protections from 
removal were intended to be “full and complete,” as compared to that for the civil service. 79 








2020] REGULATING IMPARTIALITY 1711  
president can remove only for cause and thus enjoy two tiers of 
protection from at-will removal nonetheless.89 
C. Avoiding and Resolving the Agency-Adjudicator Dilemma 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Free Enterprise Fund
directly identified the tension between the Take Care and Due Process 
Clauses when discussing ALJs. But both sides appeared to recognize 
either the constitutional or pragmatic concerns of extending Free 
Enterprise Fund too far. Responding to the dissenting Justices’ fears, 
the majority briefly proposed in a footnote two ways of distinguishing 
ALJs—and perhaps the entire civil service—from Free Enterprise 
Fund’s two-tier prohibition. First, the Court suggested that ALJs were 
merely “employees,” not “inferior officers” like the PCAOB members. 
Second, the Court suggested that ALJs had adjudicatory functions, 
while PCAOB members did not.90 But as the dissent retorted, even if 
these suggestions could limit Free Enterprise Fund’s holding, neither is 
compelling.91 If these or some other exceptions do not apply to 
adjudicators, the most likely remedy for a two-tier prohibition— 
severing one of the two tiers—either exacerbates impartiality concerns 
or creates more considerable problems. 
1. Constitutional Status. The majority first suggested that its 
holding might not reach ALJs because they might be only employees, 
not inferior officers.92 That suggestion was short-lived. The Court 
confirmed only a few years later in Lucia v. SEC that the SEC’s ALJs 
were indeed inferior officers based on two factors that the Court 
89. Based on my earlier co-authored empirical project on federal non-ALJ adjudicators, the 
following independent agencies’ non-ALJ adjudicators appear to implicate Free Enterprise 
Fund’s tiered-protection prohibition (if the non-ALJs qualify as “officers of the United States”): 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 
Federal Maritime Commission, Federal Labor Relations Authority, MSPB, National Labor 
Relations Board, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 
123–27 app. C. 
90. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB , 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010). 
 91. Id. at 536 (discussing the majority’s proposed adjudication-based exception); see id. at 
542 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing certain Justices’ earlier characterizations of ALJs as 
officers). 
 92. Id. at 507 n.10 (majority opinion). The Court has distinguished “Officers of the United 
States,” to whom the Appointments Clause applies, and employees, to whom it does not. The 
former “exercis[e] significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam), while the latter are “lesser functionaries subordinate 












1712 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1695  
applied in one of its earlier decisions, Freytag v. Commissioner.93 First, 
the ALJs held “a continuing office established by law.”94 Second, they 
wielded trial-judge-like powers, including the ability to take testimony, 
receive and rule on the admissibility of evidence, preside over trials, 
enforce compliance with discovery orders, and punish “contemptuous 
conduct” at the hearing.95 The Court clarified that inferior-officer 
status did not depend upon the SEC’s ALJs having the authority to 
issue final orders.96 Although Lucia did not go so far as to characterize 
all agencies’ ALJs as inferior officers, all ALJs hold continuous 
positions established by law and carry out similar trial-like functions.97 
Moreover, the Lucia Court was not receptive to making fine-grain 
distinctions between the SEC’s ALJs and the tax-court judges at issue 
in Freytag.98 Accordingly, the majority’s first proposed distinction 
between PCAOB members and ALJs has very likely disappeared. 
The Lucia holding probably reaches some non-ALJ adjudicators 
as well. The diversity of non-ALJ adjudicators’ duties and legal geneses 
renders it difficult to determine how many may be inferior officers. 
Yet, at least some non-ALJ adjudicators’ statuses are in play. Agencies 
have reported more than ten thousand non-ALJ adjudicators who can 
preside over adversarial hearings.99 While overseeing such hearings, 
non-ALJ adjudicators likely wield many powers exercised by trial 
judges or ALJs—satisfying Freytag’s second prong. Indeed, Freytag
itself held that certain tax-court judges—Article II non-ALJs, mind 
93. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
94. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018). The Court noted that the SEC’s ALJs have a 
career appointment with their “duties, salary, and means of appointment” provided by statute (or 
implementing regulations). See id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878). 
 95. Id. at 2053–54. 
 96. See id. at 2053 n.4 (rejecting the view that “final decisionmaking authority is a sine qua 
non of officer status”). 
97. Perhaps the Court would distinguish the ALJs who work for the Social Security 
Administration (“SSA”) from the SEC ALJs because they hold inquisitorial, as opposed to 
adversarial, hearings. But the Lucia factors would appear to apply equally to SSA ALJs: the SSA 
ALJs perform the functions that the Lucia Court identified, and—at any rate—they sometimes 
hold adversarial hearings. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1765(a) (2019). 
 98. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054–55 (dismissing distinctions concerning adjudicators’ 
compliance powers and agency superiors’ deference to their decisions). 
99. Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 8. In the study, we asked agencies to report whether 
they had “Non-ALJ Hearings,” which in brief were those in which “[o]ne of the parties to the 
adjudication can—by statute, regulation, or other law—obtain an oral hearing over which an 
agency official presides to present evidence, even if most matters are handled through written 
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you—were inferior officers.100 Moreover, in Lucia’s aftermath, the 
solicitor general counseled federal agencies to treat their non-ALJ 
adjudicators as inferior officers.101 The government has also agreed in 
recent litigation that administrative judges for the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development were inferior officers.102 Relatedly, 
the Federal Circuit recently held that the more than two hundred 
administrative patent judges103 were principal—not merely inferior— 
officers based, in part, on their civil service protection from at-will 
removal.104 
Whether non-ALJ adjudicators hold continuing positions 
established by law is a more challenging question. Some are hired on 
an ad hoc or part-time basis,105 although it appears that most have 
continuing positions.106 However, some of their positions may not be 
specified by statute, as ALJs’ are. For instance, immigration judges 
have a direct statutory genesis,107 but Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission administrative judges do not.108 Nonetheless, the exact 
contours of an office “established by [l]aw” are not well-defined. 
Congress may not need to refer to a position as an “office” or even 
specifically identify the office. Instead, the Office of Legal Counsel has 
focused more on the nature of the duties performed and the continuous 
nature of the position, perhaps reading the “established by [l]aw” 
predicate out of Article II altogether.109 In short, Lucia’s holding may 
sweep up numerous non-ALJ adjudicators, but its reach is not easy to 
determine. 
 100. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) as the 
decision that “decides this case”). 
 101. See Memorandum from the Solicitor General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Agency Gen. 
Counsels, Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.) 3 (July 2018) 
[hereinafter SG Mem.]. 
 102. See Associated Mortg. Bankers, Inc. v. Carson, No. CV 17-0075, 2019 WL 108882, at *5, 
*7 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2019). 
103. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 941 F.3d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 104. Id. at 1327–29. 
 105. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 35 (noting that of the reported non-ALJs, 
“[o]nly 39 of the 10,831 non-ALJs . . . are part-time agency employees”). As an example, the 
FDIC reported that it hired hearing officers on an ad hoc basis. See id. at 34 fig.1. 
 106. See id. at 39–48. 
 107. See Jennifer L. Cotton, If Established by Law, Then an Administrative Judge Is an 
Officer, 53 GA. L. REV. 309, 333 (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012)). 
 108. See id.
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Yet, a first-order question remains: Even if certain non-ALJs are 
not “Officers of the United States,” why should it matter for purposes 
of Free Enterprise Fund’s two-tier prohibition whether the subordinate 
is an officer or an employee? Perhaps the idea is that the president 
needs to be able to supervise all executive officials who “exercis[e] 
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”110 
because of their policymaking authority. But should the president not 
have just as much authority over employees who execute ministerial 
functions, especially if the employee is bad at his job? Those 
functions—such as the ministerial duty of delivering a commission in 
Marbury v. Madison111—are equally necessary for “the Laws [to] be 
faithfully executed” under the Take Care Clause.112 Thus, although this 
distinction could save much of the civil service’s insulation, it lacks any 
obvious normative basis. 
2. Adjudication Function.  Because constitutional status no longer 
distinguishes ALJs from the PCAOB members in Free Enterprise 
Fund, the Court could instead rely upon its second proposed ground: 
all adjudicators, or at least those who provide recommended decisions, 
are different in kind from the policymaking PCAOB members.113 This 
distinction between policymaking and adjudication is “fairly intuitive” 
because adjudicators are often understood to maintain the rule of 
law,114 not create or enforce it. It also has historical support. For 
example, the drafters of the APA gave ALJs—but not other agency 
officials—protection from at-will removal “to render [ALJs] 
independent and secure in their tenure and compensation.”115 Indeed, 
even James Madison, a strong proponent of the president’s removal 
power, thought that an administrative adjudicator who presides over 
hearings in which the United States is a party “should not hold his 
office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Government.”116 
110. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam). 
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 158 (1803).
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
113. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010).
 114. Heidi Kitrosser, The Accountable Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1741, 1751 (2009).
 115. S. REP. NO. 752 (1945), reprinted in APA LEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 29. 
Representative Francis Walter of Pennsylvania noted that his concern that run-of-the-mill civil 
service protections were “exaggerated” led him to support the more robust protection for ALJs. 
79 CONG. REC. (1946), reprinted in APALEG. HISTORY, supra note 52, at 371. 
 116. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 611–12 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of James 
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The Wiener Court later relied upon an executive official’s adjudicatory 
duties to interpret a statute as limiting the president’s at-will removal. 
In dismissing recent challenges to ALJs’ double insulation from at-will 
removal, lower courts have quickly adopted this adjudication– 
policymaking distinction.117 
The initial problem with this justification is that it may not 
distinguish ALJs from the PCAOB members. The Free Enterprise
Court framed its holding as applying to an “inferior officer [who] 
determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United States”118 
and stated that the PCAOB members did not exercise adjudicatory 
functions.119 The dissenters responded that the majority decision itself 
expressly listed the PCAOB members’ adjudicatory responsibilities 
when describing their powers.120 Indeed, numerous agency heads, like 
the PCAOB members, have both adjudicatory and other policymaking 
authority.121 
Nonetheless, even if one can meaningfully distinguish between 
PCAOB members and ALJs by considering adjudicatory or 
policymaking functions, cleaving adjudication from “policymaking” is 
exceedingly difficult. As scholars122 and the Supreme Court itself have 
 117. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1319 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (declining to resolve 
the issue but having “serious doubts” about removal provisions’ unconstitutionality based on the 
ALJs’ adjudicatory nature), vacated and remanded on other grounds by 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 
2016); Duka v. SEC, 103 F. Supp. 2d 382, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), abrogated on other grounds by
Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2016). D.C. Circuit Judges Wilkins and Rogers distinguished 
Free Enterprise Fund by arguing that the “good cause” protection for ALJs, as opposed to the 
more protective statutory for-cause provision for PCAOB members, permitted the president or 
department heads to have sufficient supervisory control. PHH Corp., 881 F.3d at 116 n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 2018) (Wilkins, J., concurring). The majority in Free Enterprise Fund suggested that the 
different removal standards might permit distinction. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 502–03, 
506. The dissenting justices, however, criticized the majority for failing to make any such 
suggestion clear. See id. at 537 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
 118. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 484.
 119. See id. at 507 n.10 (“And unlike members of the Board, many administrative law judges 
of course perform adjudicative rather than enforcement or policymaking functions . . . .”). 
 120. See id. at 536 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 485 (majority opinion) (discussing PCAOB’s 
authority to “initiate[] formal investigations and disciplinary proceedings” and sanction regulated 
parties). 
 121. See Jellum, supra note 19, at 734 (noting that “members of the [PCAOB] performed 
adjudicative functions” as well as policymaking functions).
 122. See generally Charles Koch, Jr., Administrative Judges’ Role in Developing Social Policy, 
68 LA. L. REV. 1095, 1100–02 (2008) (recognizing that ALJs have “the dual role of applying 
general agency policy and assuring individual fairness in its application”); Charles H. Koch, Jr., 
Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 740 (2005) (emphasizing the 
demands imposed on ALJs based on “[t]he operation of administrative policy development 
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recognized,123 adjudication is simply one method through which 
agencies make policy. One only need consider the NLRB’s long-
standing reliance on adjudication for confirmation.124 Moreover, all 
lawful agency action is, and must be, an exercise of the executive power 
under the separation of powers. Execution of the law occurs via 
prosecution or enforcement, rulemaking (quasi-legislative power), and 
adjudication (quasi-judicial power).125 
Perhaps the Court meant to distinguish those who have final
adjudicatory—and thus final policymaking—authority from officials 
who do not. After all, the Court, in the same breath in which it 
mentioned the adjudication-based distinction, also indicated that 
ALJs, unlike PCAOB members, “possess purely recommendatory 
powers.”126 But that, too, is troubling. The statutory default under the 
APA is that ALJs can issue final—not recommended—orders unless 
the agency provides otherwise in a specific case or by rule across the 
board.127 Numerous non-ALJ adjudicators can also issue final orders.128 
Moreover, it is far from clear that agencies’ use of their discretion to 
limit ALJs from issuing final decisions in all or specific cases would 
avoid offending Article II. The Court unanimously held in the 
nondelegation context that agencies could not cure a separation-of-
powers violation by limiting the power that Congress gave agencies in 
a statute.129 Finally, although courts could distinguish certain ALJs or 
non-ALJs from the PCAOB members by looking to some kind of 
actual or possible final-order authority, they will dig themselves into 
 123. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). 
 124. Amy Semet, An Empirical Examination of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 103 MINN. L.
REV. 2255, 2278 (2019). 
 125. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.28 (1988) (noting the difficulty in defining 
purely executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-adjudicative categories, and noting that all of these 
powers are “‘executive’ at least to some degree”).
126. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 507 n.10 (2010). 
127. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2018). See also Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 152 (1993), which 
stated: 
[I]nitial decisions could become final agency decisions in the absence of an agency 
appeal. Agencies may avoid the finality of an initial decision, first, by adopting a rule 
that an agency appeal be taken before judicial review is available, and, second, by 
providing that the initial decision would be ‘inoperative’ pending appeal. Otherwise, 
the initial decision becomes final and the aggrieved party is entitled to judicial review.
(citation omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(b)).
 128. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 53 fig.16 (detailing what kind of non-ALJs may 
issue final orders). 
 129. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–73 (2001) (rejecting the 
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the exact fact-bound, labyrinthine Article II warren that the Lucia
Court sought to avoid under the Appointments Clause.130 
Finally, perhaps the Court meant (or might elect) to exclude 
“dedicated adjudicators”—those without rulemaking, enforcement, or 
other policymaking authority—from Free Enterprise Fund’s double-
insulation prohibition.131 After all, one plausible distinction between 
ALJs and non-ALJs, on one hand, and the PCAOB members, on the 
other hand, is that only the former have a purely adjudicative 
function.132 But an adjudicator-based exception would be inconsistent 
with the Court’s formalist doctrine. The Court’s double-insulation 
prohibition was formal because the Court held that two, but not one, 
good-cause provisions were problematic without explaining how the 
second provision materially limited the president’s supervisory 
authority.133 In fact, the dissenters explained at length the rarity—if it 
has ever happened—of the second provision having any effect on the 
president’s supervision.134 For the majority, though, the importance of 
the president’s barely or theoretically affected supervisory authority 
was more important than any perceived benefits from double 
insulation.135 An adjudicator-only exception would exist, however, 
because it recognizes the functional benefit of limiting the supervisory 
power to promote impartiality and the functional difference between 
adjudication in the main and policymaking tools. The benefit of 
adjudicatory impartiality would trump the rule-based certainty and 
formality of double insulation. If a functional exception exists for 
adjudicators under Article II, that exception at the very least conflicts 
with the Court’s separation-of-powers formalism and more 
problematically undermines the normative force of formalism 
altogether.136 
3. Shedding a Tier. If neither Free Enterprise Fund distinction 
prevails, the most likely outcome is that the Court will sever one of the 
 130. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
131. Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2413 
(2011). 
 132. See id. at 2413–18 (describing scholarship before Free Enterprise Fund that argued for 
distinguishing dedicated adjudicators from those with other policymaking tools and providing 
interpretations of Free Enterprise Fund that might support that distinction). 
133. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 492–508 (2010). 
 134. Id. at 524–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 498–502 (majority opinion).
 136. See Barnett, Standing For, supra note 25, at 674–76 (describing the Court’s turn to 
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two tiers that exists for ALJs and numerous non-ALJ adjudicators. As 
I have discussed at length elsewhere, courts frequently sever offending 
removal provisions as a cure for Article II violations.137 In Free 
Enterprise Fund itself, the Court severed only one of the two tiers of 
protections for the PCAOB members. 138 The virtue of one-tier 
severance for agency adjudicators is that it provides as much protection 
from at-will removal as Article II permits under Free Enterprise Fund. 
Despite its ease and intuitive appeal, that remedy is no panacea. 
Assume that the Court, as it did in Free Enterprise Fund with 
PCAOB, severs the provision that directly precludes the at-will 
removal of ALJs or non-ALJ adjudicators but leaves the good-cause 
protection for the MSPB. This outcome creates impartiality problems, 
especially in agency proceedings in which the agency is a party, because 
the agency adjudicators are subject to at-will removal and other 
adverse action. If the adjudicators’ agencies can remove them at will, 
the remaining tier of removal protection for the MSPB becomes
meaningless, or nearly so. The MSPB has nothing to review because 
the agency can remove the adjudicator for any reason or caprice, 
except perhaps for certain unconstitutional grounds, such as racial 
discrimination. Moreover, even if the Court took this route, some 
adjudicators work for independent agencies, like the SEC, and would 
have two tiers of protection that remain anyway. Severing the 
independent agency’s protection would lead to the end of independent 
agencies altogether. 
Assume this time that the Court severs the MSPB’s protection 
from at-will removal but leaves the adjudicators’ immediate protection 
in place. The outcome helps protect the adjudicators’ impartiality in 
the first instance, but it creates impartiality concerns for the MSPB, 
whose members the president could not previously remove at will. At-
will removal of the MSPB fundamentally changes the civil service 
statutory scheme and impacts adjudicators and nonadjudicators alike. 
Indeed, the fundamental change to the statutory scheme suggests 
that severance of the MSPB’s insulation protection is an inappropriate 
response. Severance is inappropriate when it “is evident that the 
legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within 
 137. See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in 
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 517–27 (2014) (discussing courts’ use of 
severance in separation-of-powers decisions). 
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its power, independently of that which is not.”139 Although deciphering 
legislative intent on severance matters often proves “elusive,”140 
severing the MSPB’s protection would erase a key innovation of the 
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 that altered the preexisting at-will 
removal that applied to the MSPB’s predecessor, the Civil Service 
Commission.141 The Senate Report for the Act, without dissent from 
the House Report, noted that the protection from at-will removal was 
meant to “ensure that the [MSPB would] be independent of the 
direction and control of the president.”142 In short, the case for 
severance of the MSPB’s protection imperils the entire civil service and 
offends doctrinal limits on severance. 
* * * 
Of course, I have no crystal ball, and I cannot say with any 
certainty whether the Supreme Court will provide ALJs and other 
agency adjudicators a carve-out from Free Enterprise Fund’s tiered-
removal prohibition. It may well be that the Court would find a 
functional exception to its formalist jurisprudence that considers 
adjudicators’ functions within the executive branch and the competing 
due process values. Yet the Court’s rejection of its proposed 
officer/employee distinction—in the same footnote in Free Enterprise 
Fund as the policymaker/adjudicator distinction—only a few years 
later in Lucia should give one pause. In the meantime, the executive 
branch can take action to mitigate ill effects from applying Free 
Enterprise Fund’s prohibition to ALJs, or to improve agency 
adjudication’s legitimacy even if the Court places ALJs outside of the 
prohibition. 
139. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Champlin Refining Co. 
v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). 
140. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 932 (1983).
 141. See Frug, supra note 23, at 955 (citing Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, pmbl., 22 Stat. 403). 
The main debate between the House and the Senate concerned whether the Director of OPM, 
not the MSPB, should have protection from the president’s at-will removal. Congress deleted the 
protection for the OPM director but sought to provide a measure of independence by providing 
him or her a four-year term. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 95-1717, at 132 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2865–66; see also 5 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2019) (imposing no for-cause 
requirement for removal). 
 142. S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 28 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2750. 
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II. INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS
Internal separation of powers or functions within the executive 
branch provides an alternative solution to the agency-adjudicator 
dilemma. Competition among the branches—through separation of 
powers or checks and balances—creates “friction” to improve 
governmental decision-making.143 But interbranch competition is often 
absent, whether because the separation of branches has become a 
separation of political parties;144 Congress has delegated significant 
authority to the executive;145 or judicial doctrines limit nuanced, 
functional interactions among the branches.146 When branches will not 
or cannot limit one another,147 one branch may find it beneficial to limit 
its own authority by creating its own friction.148 For instance, the 
judiciary may find it wise to rely on self-imposed prudential 
doctrines—such as ripeness, primary jurisdiction, or abstention—that 
delay or avoid decision-making altogether. Or the Senate may use the 
self-imposed filibuster to require supermajorities for passing bills. Or, 
as is most relevant here, the executive can and frequently does use 
numerous internal devices, including those related to removing 
executive officials, to improve its decision-making.  
As this Part discusses, these internal devices within the executive 
branch—often referred to collectively as “internal administrative 
law”—can regulate agency personnel in numerous ways. One way 
includes establishing internal separation of powers to create some 
independence for agency officials, including adjudicators, from 
partisan reprisal. In fact, the executive branch has a long-standing, yet 
perhaps overlooked, history of providing civil service protections to 
 143. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317 (2006). 
 144. See generally Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2006) (arguing that the Founders’ version of separation of powers has been 
replaced by competition between political parties, whereby the branches largely compete only 
when the parties do). 
145. See Katyal, supra note 143, at 2319 (discussing the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Act and the USA PATRIOT Act after the 9/11 terror attacks). 
 146. See generally Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407 (2017) 
(arguing against the judicial inclination that novel statutory provisions that seek to address new 
problems violate separation-of-powers or federalism principles). 
147. For a recent discussion of how Congress imposes “statutory separation of powers” on 
the executive in the energy-regulation sphere, see generally Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory 
Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378 (2019). 
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improve the professionalism of executive officials through internal 
administrative law. 
A. Separation of Powers via Internal Administrative Law 
Internal administrative law, in its purest form, concerns 
mechanisms or norms that originate from “within the agency or the 
executive branch . . . that speak primarily to government personnel.”149 
It can both limit and empower agencies,150 and fill an important 
regulatory void. For instance, Professors Gillian Metzger and Kevin 
Stack argue that judicial control over agencies will never be sufficient 
to ease anxieties about the administrative state or successfully 
regulate the exercise of administrative power. Instead, core internal 
features of agencies—such as management structures, guidance, 
planning and coordination, civil service, professionalism, and the 
like—need to be recognized as central to administrative law, as they 
once were in administrative law’s early years.151 
In other words, internal administrative law is a useful, even if 
sometimes forgotten, instrument for improving bureaucratic decision-
making and promoting legitimacy within a democratic government. 
Internal administrative law can further many objectives. It can 
promote presidential control and efficiency, as then-Professor Elena 
Kagan argued in her prominent commendation of centralized 
presidential administration.152 Nevertheless, she recognized that good 
government needs more than centralization and efficiency.153 Picking 
up where Kagan left off, then-Professor Nina Pillard argued that the 
president should instruct agencies not to aggrandize executive 
authority at every opportunity and instead seek to protect private 
rights.154 Doing so can reduce constitutional tensions and avoid 
normatively unattractive results.155 Pillard noted that the power of 
internal administrative law and executive-made constitutional law 
149. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
1239, 1251 (2017). 
 150. Id. at 1248. 
 151. Id. at 1246–47. 
 152. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2339–41 (2001). 
 153. See, e.g., id. at 2352–58 (discussing the utility of expertise); id. at 2342–44 (discussing 
checks and balances). 
154. Cornelia T. L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 745 (2005). 
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permit the executive branch “unilaterally to increase its vigilance 
against rights violations.”156 Executive action that curtails individual 
rights, in contrast, requires judicial approbation.157 In fact, during the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt administration, the Attorney General’s 
Committee on Administrative Procedure highlighted how internal 
administrative law could protect private rights, especially in the 
absence of judicial review.158 
One flavor of internal administrative law is internal separation of 
powers. Although internal administrative law may often connote a 
mechanism for promoting centralized policymaking, as Kagan 
suggested,159 the executive can also use it to make it harder to control 
particular outcomes. Internal separation of powers disrupts absolute 
hierarchical control over personnel or decision-making within one 
agency or the entire executive branch. It may pit the executive 
bureaucracy against other bureaucrats or political appointees, or 
protect one group from another.160 
Many of the mechanisms for internal separation of powers are 
familiar and demonstrate the ways in which the executive—alone or 
with Congress—has limited its ability to act. Professor Neal Katyal 
identifies “separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review 
of government action by different agencies, civil-service protections for 
agency workers, reporting requirements to Congress, and an impartial 
decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts.”161 Other tools 
include the Department of State’s “Dissent Channel.” This channel 
permits diplomatic officials to express disagreement with official 
position and obtain a response.162 But even less formal independence 
can be useful. The day-to-day, de facto freedom that the solicitor 
general has from the president and the attorney general gives her the 
 156. Id. at 682. 
 157. Id.
 158. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1274 (“Even in the sphere in which judicial 
review is available important private interests must still be left to the practically unreviewable 
judgment of the administrative tribunals and reliance be placed on other controls for the fair 
exercise of that judgment.” (quoting ATTORNEY GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL 
REPORT 77 (1941))). 
 159. Kagan, supra note 152, at 2316, 2384.
 160. See Katyal, supra note 143, at 2317 (explaining that internal separation of powers creates 
friction and results in better decision-making). 
 161. Id. at 2318. 
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ability to consider the long-term interests of the executive branch and 
cultivate authority and credibility with the courts.163 
Internal separation of powers, as well as other forms of internal 
administrative law, are consistent with the formal unitary executive 
theory that has gained prominence in conservative legal circles.164 
Under that theory, “all federal officers exercising executive power 
must be subject to the direct control of the President.”165 This theory is 
deeply suspicious of congressional attempts to limit presidential 
control. The theory further divides itself into subtheories that 
require—from strongest to weakest—direct presidential control over 
all executive decisions, the president’s authority to nullify an officer’s 
discretionary decision, or presidential power to fire any principal 
executive officer at will.166 Because internal administrative law can be 
self-imposed—that is, without Congress—constitutional separation-of-
powers concerns fall away. No other branch is interfering with 
executive authority. Relatedly, because the president or agency heads 
retain the authority to reverse earlier internal executive actions in 
nearly all cases,167 one president cannot bind a later one.168 Because 
self-limiting actions do not implicate the constitutional separation of 
powers, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he President can always 
choose to restrain himself in his dealings with subordinates.”169 
 163. See Pillard, supra note 154, at 705 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2000)); id. at 707 (citing 28 
C.F.R. § 0.135 (2004)); id. at 726–33. This is not to say that political actors never intervene in the 
solicitor general’s decision-making. See id. at 707 n.94 (describing various ways in which the 
solicitor general’s superiors in the Justice Department may involve themselves in litigation 
strategies). 
 164. See generally Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: 
A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070 (2009) 
(discussing how the conservative political movement has turned to the unitary executive as a 
political tool since the 1970s). 
165. Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, 
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992). 
 166. See Kitrosser, supra note 114, at 1746.
167. One president can repeal an earlier president’s executive order. See Richard H. Seamon, 
Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA.L.REV. 553, 588 (2018). Likewise, agencies can repeal an earlier 
administration’s regulations by using the same process that the agency used to promulgate them 
in the first instance. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2018) (defining “rule making” as “formulating . . . 
or repealing a rule”); id. § 553 (providing requirements for substantive and other forms of 
rulemaking); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514–15 (2009) (noting 
that agencies need not demonstrate that the repealed rule is better than the previous rule, but 
agencies may have to account for strong reliance interests). 
 168. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (“[The president] cannot . . . 
choose to bind his successors by diminishing their powers . . . .”). 
 169. Id. at 497.
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To be sure, compared to statutory administrative law, internal 
administrative law’s significant disadvantage is that it has less 
permanence and permits easier repeal. Yet agencies can create more 
regulatory permanence by using notice-and-comment procedures for 
the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of internal rules.170 Unless 
repealed, the regulations would likely have the force of law. For 
instance, when President Nixon challenged a subpoena by a special 
prosecutor whom the attorney general appointed per executive 
regulations, the Court stated in dicta: “So long as this regulation [that 
bestows power on the special counsel] remains in force the executive 
branch is bound by it, and indeed the United States as the sovereign 
composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to enforce 
it.”171 Internal administrative law that requires a transparent process 
for amendment or repeal provides a “credible commitment” of the 
agency’s self-restraint because agencies must follow their own internal 
rules.172 
B. Protecting Officials from At-Will Removal 
Internal separation of powers has an established, though perhaps 
largely forgotten, provenance in insulating the federal bureaucracy. 
The development of the civil service has been the subject of many 
tomes, articles, and government reports. My purpose here is to 
demonstrate briefly internal separation of powers’ significant role in 
developing the service’s protections from at-will removal. 
Presidents have rarely exercised their powers of at-will removal 
over lower-level bureaucrats. In the Decision of 1789, Congress 
decided—by a decisive vote in the House and one vote in the Senate— 
that impeachment was not the exclusive means of removing federal 
officials: the president could also remove them.173 However, executive-
led removal of civil servants remained extremely rare in the decades 
 170. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.10, at 669 (5th ed. 
2010). 
171. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974); accord United States ex rel. Accardi v. 
Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954).
172. Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1284 (citing Elizabeth Magill, Foreword, Agency 
Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 873–74 (2009)). The Supreme Court has not 
resolved the long-standing question as to whether agencies are bound to both their legislative 
rules and their nonlegislative guidance, or only the former. Lower courts have come out both 
ways. See id. at 1285–86. 
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following the Founding and usually only involved removals for cause.174 
In fact, presidential behavior did not change even when Congress 
enacted the Tenure of Office Act of 1820 to render it easier for the 
president to remove federal officials.175 By imposing fixed, four-year 
terms for many federal officials and clarifying the president’s ability to 
remove them at will, Congress sought to limit any inference that 
removal impugned the character of the officials. Nonetheless, 
presidents did not take advantage of their authority to fire existing 
federal employees at the end of their statutory four-year terms. 
Instead, they routinely reappointed employees to additional terms.176 
The well-known spoils system—of replacing existing officials with 
loyalists—did not begin with gusto until the Jackson administration. 
Yet even President Jackson limited his spoils system to approximately 
20 percent of the federal bureaucracy.177 
Contemporaries recognized the spoils system as a suboptimal 
bureaucratic system during its heyday,178 but it was likely a necessary 
step to bureaucratic maturity. Noted political scientist Francis 
Fukuyama argues that what Americans commonly refer to as a spoils 
system is, in fact, “clientelism,” whereby politicians award jobs and 
other benefits to supporters on a large, well-organized scale.179 
Clientelism occurs as a frequent step in democratic maturity as 
politicians endeavor to command majority-voting blocks. Numerous 
countries bear witness.180 Indeed, clientelism may be especially 
democratic in the sense that the election of a president indicates the 
public wants a change in the on-the-ground bureaucratic 
 174. See id. at 949–50 (“[F]or the first thirty years of the country’s history, with the exception 
of Jefferson’s attempt to modify the political balance of the government work force, removals 
were rare, and those made were for cause.”). 
175. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 102, 3 Stat. 582. 
 176. See Frug, supra note 23, at 950–51. 
 177. See id. at 951–52; see also Farkas v. Thornburgh, 493 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 
1980) (“Although some historians trumpet Jackson’s pervasive endorsement and exploitation of 
patronage, actually Jackson removed no more than one-tenth to one-fifth of the previously 
appointed federal service.”).
 178. See Farkas, 493 F. Supp. at 1170 n.8 (discussing nineteenth-century criticism of the 
patronage system). An office seeker’s assassination of President Garfield created an impetus for 
reforming civil service selection and enacting the Pendleton Act. See William R. Sherman, A 
Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, 112 MICH. L. REV. 905, 914 (2014). 
 179. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY 86 (2014).
 180. See id. at 91–93 (noting that clientelism is a manner of mobilizing voters in early 
democracies; that Taiwan and the United States have turned away from it; and that Italy, Japan, 
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administration.181 But what clientelism does to enrich democratic 
accountability can undermine the bureaucracy’s ability to work in a 
fair, impartial, and efficient way—just ask Greece and Italy.182 
As the federal bureaucracy and national economy became more 
complex after the Civil War, Congress enacted statutes to render the 
bureaucracy more professional. In one of its first efforts,183 Congress 
passed the Pendleton Act of 1883, creating a competitive examination 
process for hiring civil servants.184 The Act, however, neither required 
the president to hire based on the examination scores nor regulated the 
president’s removal authority.185 Instead, it merely permitted the 
president to use the Civil Service Commission to administer the 
examination, as opposed to relying upon political-party bosses.186 
Removal protections were thought unnecessary because the president 
would have little incentive to remove if a merit system, not patronage, 
governed new hires.187 
Professor Gerald Frug has demonstrated that the executive, not 
Congress, became the driving force behind the push to limit the 
president’s removal authority during the bureaucracy’s expansion at 
the turn of the twentieth century.188 The executive agency charged with 
overseeing the civil service, the Civil Service Commission, had asked 
President Cleveland to issue an executive order that would require a 
removing official to provide the reason for removal and include it in 
departmental records.189 Although Cleveland declined to do so,190 
 181. See CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 42 (1904); id. at 78 
(“[W]hen the people voted in 1828 that John Quincy Adams should leave office, they 
undoubtedly intended to vote that most of the civil servants should go with him.”).
 182. See generally  FUKUYAMA, supra note 179, at 94–134 (describing how old forms of 
clientelism in Italy and Greece led to the Italian and Grecian financial crises in the 2000s). 
183. The Tenure of Office Act of 1867 was not aimed so much at improving the working of 
the bureaucracy but as limiting the ability of President Johnson to remove officials without the 
Senate’s approbation. See Frug, supra note 23, at 952–53. 
184. Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, § 2, 22 Stat. 403.
 185. See Frug, supra note 23, at 954–55. 
 186. See id.
 187. See id. at 955. Professor Jennifer Mascott suggests that the Supreme Court has intimated 
a similar, yet inverse, relationship in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988): the more control 
that the executive has over appointment, the less control the executive needs over removal. See 
Mascott, supra note 56, at 38–39. 
 188. See generally Frug, supra note 23, at 947–61 (describing the history of the civil service 
and the presidential power to remove, especially how presidents would limit removal power 
through executive orders). 
 189. See 15 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 19 (1899). 
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President McKinley did. In fact, McKinley went even further, ordering 
that “[n]o removal shall be made from any position subject to 
competitive examination except for just cause and upon written 
charges filed with the head of the department or other appointing 
officer, and of which the accused shall have full notice and an 
opportunity to make defense.”191 McKinley, accordingly, required “just 
cause” for removal from the competitive civil service and provided, at 
the very least, internal process for the employee at issue.
To assuage the Commission’s concern that fired officials could 
obtain a trial over the reason for their removal under McKinley’s 
order, Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft clarified in 
executive orders that notice and opportunity to be heard provided only 
the right to reply to one’s agency superiors before removal.192 
Roosevelt’s order also clarified that “just cause” for removal “was 
intended to mean any cause, other than one merely political or 
religious, which will promote the efficiency of the service.” Employees 
had no right to judicial review of their superior’s absolute discretion to 
determine when sufficient cause existed for removal.193 
Starting around the time of the Roosevelt and Taft orders, 
Congress took a series of uneven actions on the removal front. First, it 
codified in the Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 the “efficiency of the 
service” standard and the right of employees to respond to their agency 
superiors found in the earlier presidential orders.194 Second, in the 
Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944, Congress extended additional rights 
to veterans by allowing them to challenge their removal in an oral 
hearing and to seek review from the Civil Service Commission.195 
Third, in 1946 Congress created the office of ALJs (then called 
“hearing examiners”) and limited ALJs’ removal “only for good cause 
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission . . . after 
opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.”196 The 
 191. 14 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 24 (1898). 
 192. See Frug, supra note 23, at 956–58. 
 193. See id. at 957 (quoting 19 U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N ANN. REP. 76 (1902)). 
 194. See id. at 958 (citing Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 389, § 6, 37 Stat. 555 (codified as amended 
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7102 (1970)). The relevant language permitted only removal with “such cause 
as will promote the efficiency of [the civil] service,” and the statute granted only a right to written 
reasons and a written opportunity to respond. § 6, 37 Stat. 555.
 195. See Frug, supra note 23, at 959. 
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incongruity of review for different federal employees led to calls for a 
uniform system.197 
The executive, not Congress, initially responded. President 
Kennedy established administrative appeals within each agency for 
adverse employment actions and granted all employees a right to an 
oral hearing. President Nixon went further. He granted nonveterans 
the same right that veterans had to appeal to the Commission and later 
abolished the Kennedy-era appeals within each agency.198 These 
executive-led improvements culminated in the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1978 (“CRA”),199 which Congress enacted largely to restore 
eroded trust in the federal government after Watergate.200 Among 
numerous other things, the CRA abolished the Commission and 
created two agencies to assume its functions: OPM would largely 
oversee hiring and personnel management, while the MSPB would, 
among other things, review agency-imposed removals and discipline.201 
In summary, the story of insulating executive officials from at-will 
removal is largely one of executive invention and impetus, followed by 
eventual congressional codification of many of the executive-imposed 
personnel measures. 
III. IMPARTIALITY REGULATIONS
Internal separation of powers is extremely beneficial to agency 
adjudicators. Justice Breyer recognized in his Free Enterprise Fund 
dissent that “sometimes it is necessary to disable oneself . . . to achieve 
a broader objective. . . . If the President seeks to regulate through 
impartial adjudication, then insulation of the adjudicator from removal 
at will can help him achieve that goal.”202 A subordinate decision-
maker’s “neutrality might inspire confidence,” according to Professor 
Katyal, “both in the public eye and in the courts, in a way that political 
decisions could not.”203 Internal administrative law for adjudication— 
 197. See Frug, supra note 23, at 960. 
 198. See id. at 961. 
199. Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.  
 200. See Julie Jones, Give A Little Whistle: The Need for a More Broad Interpretation of the 
Whistleblower Exception to the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 34 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1133, 1141 
(2003). 
 201. See Earl Sanders, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d): The Civil Service Commission Did Not Fade 
Away—Entirely, 31 HOW.L.J. 197, 199 (1988); About, U.S.MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD, 
https://www.mspb.gov/About/about.htm [https://perma.cc/AA3D-DYHY]. 
202. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477, 522 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 203. Katyal, supra note 143, at 2335.
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via regulation and executive order, or collectively, “impartiality 
regulations”—can achieve these purposes without offending the 
constitutional separation of powers. Indeed, Professor Daniel 
Rodriguez advocates for leaving matters of bias to agencies to regulate 
themselves, given the difficulty of having courts fashion doctrine to 
address various forms of bureaucratic bias, different kinds of decision-
makers, and disparate types of decisions.204 And Professor Jennifer 
Nou similarly suggests that courts “are not well-placed to adjudicate 
decisional independence claims [asserted by ALJs concerning agency 
oversight or interference], which are at their root managerial questions 
requiring political tradeoffs.”205 Impartiality regulations allow agencies 
to address matters that are, in Nou’s words, “internal to [the] agenc[y] 
and the executive branch,”206 while recognizing that these internal 
matters can impact both private parties and public perception. 
This Part proposes adopting impartiality regulations to govern 
agency adjudicators of all stripes. Section A considers how the 
executive branch can design and implement such impartiality 
regulations. The regulations that establish and protect the Office of the 
Special Counsel provide a useful template. But the impartiality 
regulations would have to clarify to whom they apply specifically, and 
they should be promulgated through notice-and-comment process to 
establish as firm a commitment to impartiality as possible from the 
executive branch. Section B then considers how the impartiality 
regulations should address adjudicators’ discipline and removal, merit-
based hiring, and other provisions that provide indicia of impartiality. 
Section C concludes by considering potential concerns or skepticism 
over impartiality regulations as a useful form of internal administrative 
law. 
A. Designing and Implementing Impartiality Regulations 
In designing impartiality regulations, the executive branch need 
not start from scratch. The Department of Justice already has 
regulations that establish the office and independence of the special 
counsel. These Special Counsel Regulations (“SCRs”) provide a 
204. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Bias in Regulatory Administration, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 76), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3430809 [https://perma.cc/RY4U-H24T]. 









       






1730 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1695  
template for adjudicatory impartiality regulations, although the
impartiality regulations should depart from some of the SCRs’ 
particulars. With a template in hand, the executive branch should next 
grapple with how to identify the adjudicators to whom the impartiality 
regulations would apply. Finally, before diving into the substance of 
the impartiality regulations, the executive drafters should consider the 
appropriate process and form for implementing their impartiality 
regulations. 
1. The Special Counsel Regulations as a Template. In brief, the 
SCRs concern the grounds for appointing a special counsel, his or her 
qualifications, jurisdiction, staffing, powers, reporting requirements, 
and removal from office.207 As most relevant to adjudicator 
impartiality, the regulations provide that the attorney general can 
remove the special counsel “for misconduct, dereliction of duty, 
incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other good cause, including 
violation of Departmental policies.”208 These regulations have 
governed the appointments of special counsels John Danforth when 
reviewing the FBI’s conduct in the Waco, Texas, siege and, most 
recently, Robert Mueller when investigating Russian interference in 
the 2016 presidential election.209 
The SCRs filled a void when Congress declined to revive the 
Office of the Independent Counsel following expiration of the Ethics 
in Government Act. That Act was widely criticized for bestowing too 
much power on the independent counsel.210 And although the Supreme 
Court held the Office of the Independent Counsel is constitutional in 
Morrison v. Olson,211 several legal scholars have found Justice Scalia’s 
lone dissent—raising various constitutional separation-of-powers 
issues—to be both prescient and convincing.212 Katyal sought to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of the past when he drafted the SCRs during 
the Clinton administration, noting that they cabin the special counsel’s 
 207. See generally General Powers of Special Counsel, 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.10 (2019). 
 208. Id. § 600.7(d). 
 209. See CYNTHIA BROWN & JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44857, SPECIAL 
COUNSEL INVESTIGATIONS: HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 8–9 (2019) 
(discussing past special counsel investigations). The appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald to 
investigate the leaking of a CIA operative’s identity did not occur under the regulations. See id.
at 9.
 210. See id. at 8. 
 211. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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investigatory discretion but still removed the special prosecutors from 
“the day-to-day control and influence of political actors.”213 
The impartiality regulations can serve a similar purpose as the 
SCRs. Both are internal devices that the executive branch can use to 
preserve useful schemes in the face of legislative silence, constitutional 
question, and pragmatic concern. Both separate a small subset of 
executive officials with sensitive duties from “day-to-day supervision 
of any official of the [agency]”214 while permitting executive superiors 
to retain final policymaking authority. The SCRs promote nonpolitical 
investigations of sensitive matters or conflicted executive actors, and 
the impartiality regulations provide the appearance of an impartial 
forum and thereby impart legitimacy to executive decision-making.  
2. Defining “Adjudicators.”  The regulations would need to first 
identify the covered adjudicators. Including ALJs is easy because their 
uniform, statutory-based status makes them easy to identify.215 Non-
ALJ adjudicators, however, prove more difficult to identify because of 
their disparate titles and diverse roles. Nevertheless, the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”)—the 
independent agency charged with providing research and 
recommendations to federal agencies and Congress—has provided two 
workable definitions. 
First, non-ALJ adjudicators could be those who preside over what 
Professor Michael Asimow terms “Type B”—as opposed to “Type 
A”—adjudications. Type A adjudications include only those that are 
“required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity 
for an agency hearing.”216 In other words, Type A hearings are those 
over which ALJs preside and which are governed by §§ 554, 556, and 
557 of the APA.217 Type B hearings, in contrast, concern “agency 
adjudication that employ evidentiary hearings required by statutes, 
 213. Katyal, supra note 143, at 2338.
214. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b) (2019). 
 215. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 3105 (2018) (provisions that expressly consider 
“administrative law judges”).
 216. Michael Asimow, Best Practices for Evidentiary Hearings Outside the Administrative 
Procedure Act, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 937 (2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 5. U.S.C. 
§ 554(a)). 
 217. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (providing the “on the record after opportunity for an agency 
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regulations, or executive orders, but are not governed by the formal 
adjudication provisions of the APA.”218 
Second, non-ALJ adjudicators could fall within a broader 
definition to include those who are not ALJs or members of the agency, 
but nonetheless preside over hearings in which parties may opt for an 
oral, evidentiary hearing under statute, regulation, or other law. 219 This 
broader definition would capture elected—but not mandatory— 
adjudications and executive officials who may only rarely oversee 
evidentiary hearings, such as patent examiners. By excluding members 
of the agency, such as agency heads and commissioners, the 
impartiality regulations maintain the traditional and APA-based 
distinction between lower-level adjudicators and agency heads. 
3. Implementing Impartiality Regulations. To implement the 
impartiality regulations, the executive branch should take a two-prong 
approach. Justice Kagan noted that “the President has the ability to 
effect comprehensive, coherent change in administrative 
policymaking.”220 To that end, the president should issue executive 
orders to all agencies, including independent agencies, at those 
independent agencies’ election. The order would provide a template 
set of notice-and-comment regulations for agencies to promulgate for 
those agency adjudicators who fall within the order’s ambit, but it 
would provide discretion to individual agencies to account for any 
necessary revisions for a particular adjudicatory scheme or enabling 
act. The executive order should ensure that the impartiality regulations 
permeate the administrative state and apply to both ALJs and non-
ALJ adjudicators. The promulgation of rules pursuant to executive 
order for each agency can find statutory basis in the APA221 and 
traditional notions of administrative common law.222 
Agencies should agree to use notice-and-comment procedures 
under 5 U.S.C. § 553 for any rulemaking—whether promulgation, 
 218. Asimow, supra note 216, at 925. 
 219. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 25 (providing a more detailed definition). 
 220. Kagan, supra note 152, at 2341.
221. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (“Each agency is granted the authority necessary to comply with the 
requirements of this subchapter through the issuance of rules or otherwise.”).
 222. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524– 
25 (1978) (establishing that courts cannot generally impose additional procedure beyond a 
statute’s requirements on agency decision-making); 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
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amendment, or repeal223—concerning impartiality regulations. It is 
true that agency management and personnel matters are excluded from 
notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements under § 553.224 
Generally, the process is less useful for matters that are merely internal 
to the agency and thus do “not affect . . . the public.”225 But agencies 
can and often do elect to use notice-and-comment process, even if the 
matter at issue falls under an exemption.226 
For impartiality regulations, the notice-and-comment process is 
beneficial in three ways. First, the process may prove useful because 
regulated parties have a direct interest in the fairness of agency 
proceedings. Second, the process, by engaging the public, is likely to 
render the impartiality regulations more salient, which is useful for 
matters related to the appearance of impartiality. Finally, the use of 
notice and comment for any amendment or repeal would render any 
change much more transparent, help create a more developed record 
for judicial review, and establish a more meaningful—and potentially 
longer-lasting—executive commitment. The agency should commit to 
using notice and comment for any amendment or repeal to create as 
much regulatory permanence as possible. 
B. The Substance of the Impartiality Regulations 
The impartiality regulations would depart from the SCRs in their 
particulars. They would not focus on authority and notifications. 
Instead, the impartiality regulations would focus on three key areas: 
discipline and removal, merit-based appointment, and additional 
indicia of separation from the agency. 
1. Discipline-and-Removal Provisions. To resolve any due process 
concern over adjudicators’ protection from at-will discipline or 
removal, the regulations should duplicate ALJs’ current statutory 
223. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (defining “rule making” to include the formulation, amendment, or 
repeal of a “rule”). 
224. 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2). The SCRs were not promulgated with notice and comment. BROWN 
& COLE, supra note 209, at 20 (citing Office of Special Counsel, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,038, 37,041 (July 
9, 1999)). 
 225. TOM C. CLARK, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 18 (1947). 
 226. See 1 PIERCE, supra note 170, § 7.10, at 669 (noting that agencies have voluntarily 
adopted notice-and-comment rulemaking, despite statutory exemptions); see also Public 
Participation in Rulemaking, 36 Fed. Reg. 13804 (July 24, 1971) (discussing the advantages of 
implementing the recommendation of the ACUS to require notice and comment, even when 
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protection from at-will adverse action for all agency adjudicators227 as 
follows: 
An agency may not take a covered action, as defined herein, against 
an adjudicator unless the Merit Systems Protection Board determines 
that good cause exists on the record after opportunity for a hearing 
before the Board. 
The “covered actions” could simply duplicate those listed as 
applying to ALJs, such as removals, suspensions, and reductions in 
pay.228 Notably, this regulation does not alter current protections for 
the entire civil service, but it does ensure that all lower-level 
adjudicators—not just ALJs—receive sufficient administrative process 
before an independent agency disciplines or removes them. It also 
provides all covered agency adjudicators with the same level of 
protection by granting the non-ALJs the more robust form of 
protection that ALJs currently enjoy.229 Adjudicators’ shared function 
and need for impartiality justify uniform removal protection.230 
The impartiality regulations go further than the SCRs by giving 
agency adjudicators, unlike the special counsel, a right to a formal 
administrative hearing and judicial review. Echoing earlier civil service 
regulations, the SCRs attempt to prevent all review by stating that the 
regulations do not create any rights that could be subject to judicial 
review.231 The impartiality regulations would not do so. Instead, they 
would seek to demonstrate a strong commitment from the executive 
branch for impartial adjudicators by permitting administrative and 
judicial review. This commitment exists because the president or 
227. 5 U.S.C. § 7521. 
 228. Id. § 7521(b). 
 229. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
230. Many, if not most, non-ALJ adjudicators are hired for a probationary period. See 5 
C.F.R. § 315.801 (2019) (OPM regulation: “Probationary period; when required”). Unless a 
statute requires otherwise for particular non-ALJs, the regulation should not subject them to 
probationary periods because of the control that it gives the agency over the adjudicator’s 
livelihood. 
231. 28 C.F.R. § 600.10 (2019) (“No creation of rights. The regulations in this part are not 
intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law or equity, by any person or entity, in any matter, civil, criminal, or 
administrative.”). The courts “have generally not . . . recognized [the SCRs] as creating judicially 
enforceable rights.” BROWN & COLE, supra note 209, at 20. The Office of Management and 
Budget included a similar no-rights provision in its “Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance 
Practices,” which established policies for developing guidance documents through executive 
agencies. See Metzger & Stack, supra note 149, at 1288 (referring to OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR 
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agency cannot, consistent with United States v. Nixon,232 simply ignore 
the regulations by disciplining adjudicators at will or without review as 
long as the regulations are in effect. Unlike special counsels, who have 
high political salience, agency adjudicators do not have significant 
public visibility and potential political protection from interference. 
The regulatory protection and right to seek review protect the more 
vulnerable adjudicators. 
Neither administrative nor judicial review requires any 
congressional action. The MSPB has broad jurisdiction to adjudicate 
matters referred to it by regulation or rule.233 All orders from the 
MSPB, in turn, are subject to deferential judicial review.234 
Notably, impartiality regulations resolve the agency-adjudicator 
dilemma. They provide a prophylactic device—limiting at-will 
discipline or removal—for protecting impartiality. Indeed, the 
presence or lack of at-will removal is the device for presidential control 
that the Court has featured in its Article II jurisprudence. At the same 
time, because the executive branch imposes the protection from at-will 
removal from within, it does not implicate Free Enterprise Fund’s 
prohibition or any other form of impermissible congressional 
limitation on presidential supervision. 
By permitting the MSPB to establish when cause exists, the 
impartiality regulations render it unnecessary to consider the 
Department of Justice’s current view that could render good-cause 
removal toothless. As part of his briefing in Lucia and subsequent 
cases, Solicitor General Noel Francisco asserted that the tiered 
protection from at-will removal for ALJs is constitutional as long as 
“good cause” permits removal for any “ALJ who fails to perform 
adequately or to follow agency policies, procedures, or instructions. . . 
. An ALJ cannot, however, be removed for any invidious reason or to 
influence the outcome in a particular adjudication.”235 Francisco 
232. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
233. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(a)(1) (“The [MSPB] shall hear, adjudicate, or provide for the hearing or 
adjudication, of all matters within the jurisdiction of the Board under . . . any . . . rule, or 
regulation . . . .”). Nothing in the regulation distinguishes between the MSPB’s appellate and 
original jurisdiction. Based on my research, the most common and long-standing way that the 
MSPB obtains jurisdiction via rule is through OPM regulations. See, e.g., Cowan v. United States, 
710 F.2d 803, 805 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
234. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1), (c). 
 235. SG Mem., supra note 101, at 9; see also Brief for Respondent Supporting Petitioners at 
50, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130), 2018 WL 1251862, at *50. But does the 
solicitor general’s interpretation mean that the agency could use removal to influence outcomes 
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continued that the “MSPB review [must be] suitably deferential to the 
determination of the Department Head.”236 In short, the solicitor 
general’s view treats the ALJs as if their protections mirrored those for 
the civil service, where the MSPB merely defers to the agency’s 
determination of cause, despite the statutory language requiring the 
MSPB to decide whether good cause exists in the first instance.237 
Because the recommended impartiality regulations would treat all 
adjudicators like ALJs for removal purposes—the opposite of the 
solicitor general’s proposed view—it is not necessary for the 
regulations to define “good cause.” The MSPB’s decisional law would 
continue to define the phrase. Moreover, with the MSPB determining 
whether cause exists, the impartiality regulations avoid the problem of 
allowing agencies to remove adjudicators based on inappropriate 
reasons under cover of vague criteria like “inadequate performance.” 
Finally, by replicating ALJs’ protection from at-will removal for 
all adjudicators, the impartiality regulations prevent an administration 
from neutering the MSPB to render the removal protections 
ineffective. For much of the Trump administration, the MSPB has not 
been able to issue final orders because it has lacked either a quorum or 
all three members.238 The inability of the MSPB to function empowers 
employing agencies by fully limiting regular federal civil servants to 
appeal adverse actions.239 Given the Trump administration’s professed 
hostility to civil service protections, the MSPB’s failure to have a 
quorum may be one strategy to ensure that civil service law goes 
unenforced.240 But the same dynamic does not hold true for ALJs and, 
as proposed, for non-ALJ adjudicators. Agencies cannot act against 
adjudicators until the MSPB permits it to do so. By requiring the MSPB 
236. SG Mem., supra note 101, at 9.
 237. See supra note 88. 
 238. See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board: Frequently Asked Questions about the Lack of 
Board Quorum and Lack of Board Members, MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD (Mar. 1, 
2019), https://www.mspb.gov/FAQs_Absence_of_Board_Quorum_March_1_2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y8TZ-CJZS] (discussing the functioning of the MSPB in light of its lack of a quorum).
 239. See Adam Mazmanian, Senate Panel Advances Third MSPB Nominee, FCW (June 20, 
2019), https://fcw.com/articles/2019/06/20/mspb-senate-quorum-mazmanian.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/UAN8-XHQ8] (noting that MSPB has a “backlog of more than 2,000 appeals”); Nicole 
Ogrysko, MSPB Has Never Been Without a Quorum for This Long, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 
12, 2018), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce-rightsgovernance/2018/01/mspb-has-never-
been-without-a-quorum-for-this-long [https://perma.cc/523B-AP9J] (noting that civil servants 
cannot get backpay or reinstatement when the MSPB lacks a quorum).
 240. See Ogrysko, supra note 239 (quoting federal employment attorney Debra D’Gostino as 
saying, “[t]he board is all about enforcement of the Civil Service Reform Act, and I just can’t see 
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to act before adverse action, the impartiality regulations better protect 
adjudicator impartiality. 
2. Merit-Based Appointment. Promulgating the removal 
provisions for the impartiality regulations addresses the agency-
adjudicator dilemma. Yet, as recent executive practice indicates, the 
regulations can be much more comprehensive. They can also consider 
merit-based hiring and various indicia of separation of functions—all 
of which relate to impartiality. The recent executive order concerning 
ALJ hiring provides a starting point. Although the executive order 
listed only one minimal requirement for ALJ hiring—concerning bar 
licensure241—agencies have already set up thoughtful processes to 
consider germane skills and attributes for impartial ALJs.242 
The impartiality regulations could go further by expressly 
requiring merit-based hiring for all agency adjudicators, subject to 
agencies’ discretion to identify the relevant qualifications for their 
particular adjudicators. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal,243 the 
Supreme Court required an elected state supreme court justice to 
recuse himself under the Due Process Clause when one party to an 
appeal had a “significant and disproportionate influence in placing the 
judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election 
campaign when the case was pending or imminent.”244 The problem 
was that the donor-party, even if indirectly, “ch[ose] the judge in his 
own case.”245 
Agencies, in comparison, are frequently parties to agency 
adjudication,246 and they can often directly select their adjudicators. 
Recall that while agencies had long hired their ALJs under an OPM-
led merit-selection process that limited agency discretion to hire 
whomever the agency preferred, a recent executive order has removed 
241. Exec. Order 13843 § 3 (July 10, 2018). The executive order did, however, list criteria that 
said ALJs “must display[:] appropriate temperament, legal acumen, impartiality, and sound 
judgment. They must also clearly communicate their decisions to the parties who appear before 
them, the agencies that oversee them, and the public that entrusts them with authority.” Id. § 1. 
 242. See JACK M. BEERMANN & JENNIFER L. MASCOTT, RESEARCH REPORT ON FEDERAL 
AGENCY ALJHIRING AFTER LUCIA AND EXECUTIVE ORDER 13843, at 30–45 (2019) (discussing 
interview-based findings of ALJ-hiring processes in numerous agencies, including DOL, HHS, 
NLRB, EPA, and FERC). 
243. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, Co., 556 U.S. 868, 870 (2009). 
 244. Id.
 245. Id. 
 246. See Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Private Enforcement in Administrative Courts, 72 VAND. L.
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ALJs from the competitive service. Agencies may now directly hire 
ALJs without going through OPM’s competitive ALJ-hiring process.247 
Likewise, agencies can often appoint their non-ALJ adjudicators from 
already-hired agency officials.248 By requiring merit-based hiring and 
mandating that agencies consider the relevant criteria for hiring on the 
front end, agencies will have less ability to engage in partisan hiring, 
even if indirectly or sub rosa. 
The concern over partisan-based hiring is not speculative. In 2018, 
The Washington Post reported that the White House rejected 
candidates for administrative judges on the Board of Veterans’ 
Appeals (“BVA”) based on the candidates’ political orientation. The 
president, who has statutory authority to approve the Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs’ appointments,249 required the candidates to list their 
political affiliations. The White House rejected the candidates 
affiliated with the Democratic Party and hired those affiliated with the 
Republican Party and one without a party affiliation who had voted in 
Republican primaries. Despite the fact that the Democratic-affiliated 
candidates were acting judges at the BVA and recommended by the 
Board’s chairperson—an official whom President Trump appointed— 
the agency reopened the position to fill the remaining vacancies.250 In 
the George W. Bush administration, the Department of Justice 
similarly engaged in partisan-based hiring of immigration judges and 
members of the Board of Immigration Appeals.251 Similar concerns 
over partisan hiring for immigration judges continue today.252 
Just as the recent executive order has given agencies more 
discretion in ALJ hiring, the impartiality regulations could ensure that 
agencies use merit-based hiring for adjudicators. The impartiality 
regulations would not readopt the OPM’s former merit-based hiring 
 247. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
248. Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 59–60, 60 fig.20. 
249. 38 U.S.C. § 7101A(a)(1) (2018). 
 250. Lisa Rein, “I’ve Never Seen These Positions Politicized”: White House Rejection of 





 251. See Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 14–15 
(2018) (describing the Department of Justice’s inquiry into the partisan hiring of immigration 
judges during the George W. Bush administration). 
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process for ALJs wholesale. To be sure, OPM, together with its 
predecessor, the Civil Service Commission, has more than a century of 
experience in merit-based hiring. But its ALJ-hiring process was widely 
criticized as too time-consuming and poorly designed.253 To work 
toward better merit-based hiring for neutral adjudicators specifically, 
the executive order and regulations could simply state as follows:
All adjudicators shall be selected, whether from outside or from 
within the agency, under a merit-based process. The agency shall 
consult the Office of Personnel Management and consider any 
recommendations from the Administrative Conference of the United 
States when establishing and revising the merit-based selection 
process for adjudicators. 
This consultation-based approach permits agencies to have more 
control over the speed and overall design of the hiring process while 
promoting appropriate merit-hiring principles. Agencies have 
preferred various subject-matter and litigation-based expertise in ALJ 
hiring,254 and at least two agencies have sought to hire only those who 
have never worked at the agency to mitigate the appearance of pro-
agency bias.255 Merit-based hiring helps ensure that the agency, despite 
directly choosing the judges in their own cases (as the Appointments 
Clause may require), considers only factors that are germane to the 
judge’s ability to adjudicate fairly, efficiently, and competently. 
Ultimately, adjudicator hiring must not permit the return of a 
patronage system. Whatever ills patronage-based hiring has for the 
civil service in general, its dangers are most apparent for officials who 
are required to apply agency policy and statutory law neutrally, without 
favor to those who may or may not have supported the hiring 
administration and its policy goals. 
3. Additional Provisions. ALJ hearings provide additional indicia 
of impartiality that are often absent in non-ALJ hearings. For instance, 
ALJs cannot have ex parte contacts with anyone about facts at issue 
and only certain, limited ex parte contacts regarding legal issues under 
 253. See, e.g., Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2004); 
Nicole Schultheis, Executive Order Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive 
Service, RESUME PLACE (July 12, 2018), https://www.resume-place.com/2018/07/alj-excepted-
from-competitive-service [https://perma.cc/7HLQ-SZLZ]. 
 254. See, e.g., BEERMANN & MASCOTT, supra note 242, at 30–45 (discussing the agencies’ 
various qualifications, including subject-matter expertise and litigation experience). 
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the APA.256 Relatedly, they cannot prosecute or investigate for the 
agency or report to anyone who does.257 They also cannot receive 
performance reviews or bonuses from their agencies.258 Some non-ALJ 
adjudicators have all or some of these prohibitions, but some do not.259 
The impartiality regulations could easily address these indicia in a way 
that promotes impartiality but also, like the provision on merit-based 
hiring, respects differences among agency adjudications. 
Ex Parte Contacts. The impartiality regulations could contain a 
prohibition on ex parte contacts with agency adjudicators. Federal 
courts have recognized that ex parte communications can create due 
process problems by undermining the fairness of the proceedings.260 
The APA has a complicated set of ex parte prohibitions that 
distinguishes between the kinds of communications, the identity of the 
decision-maker, and the nature of the agency proceeding.261 But the 
impartiality regulation can take a simpler approach for both ALJs and 
non-ALJ adjudicators—the one that ACUS’s Model Adjudication 
Rules (“MARs”) has proposed for more than twenty-five years in its 
MAR 120: 
Except as required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized 
by law, the Adjudicator may not consult a person or party on any 
matter relevant to the merits of the adjudication, unless on notice and 
opportunity for all parties to participate. This provision does not, 
 256. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2018) (prohibiting certain ex parte communications).
 257. See id. § 554(d)(2) (prohibiting supervision by investigative or prosecutorial agency 
officials); id. § 3105 (“[ALJs] . . . may not perform duties inconsistent with their duties and 
responsibilities as administrative law judges.”). 
 258. Barnett, Against Administrative Judges, supra note 33, at 1655–56. 
 259. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 61–66, 67–70, 73–83 (presenting survey data on 
the nature of limitations, if any, on non-ALJ adjudicators’ ex parte communications). In my 
earlier study, my co-author and I reported that 14 percent of the identified types of non-ALJs 
who responded to the survey had no ex parte prohibitions. See id. at 68 fig.25. 
260. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Fed. 
Maritime Comm’n, 584 F.2d 519, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“The inconsistency of secret Ex parte 
contacts with the notion of a fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process 
has long been recognized.”); Appeal of Pub. Serv. Co., 454 A.2d 435, 441–43 (N.H. 1982) (holding 
that even in the absence of procedures by the legislature, due process requires state commission 
members to refrain from ex parte communications when they act in an adjudicative capacity). 
 261. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (prohibiting ex parte communications concerning facts with 
anyone and limiting certain investigating or prosecuting employees from advising ALJs); id.
§ 557(d) (prohibiting ex parte communications concerning the merits of the proceeding with those 
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however, preclude the Adjudicator from consulting with adjudicatory 
employees such as law clerks.262 
Agencies could turn to MAR 120 and its additional provisions— 
which govern agency heads, the timing of the prohibition, and 
remediation for violations—for additional considerations and 
guidance. Although many non-ALJ adjudicators are already subject to 
the standard provided in MAR 120,263 a recent survey indicated that 
approximately 14 percent of the reported non-ALJ types—that is, 
identifiable groups of non-ALJs within an agency—have no limitations 
whatsoever on ex parte communications.264 
Separation of Functions and Bonus Eligibility. Relatedly, the 
impartiality regulations could require separation of functions for all 
adjudicators, meaning that adjudicators can only adjudicate, not 
perform other agency functions. Agencies recently indicated that 
about 43 percent of reported non-ALJ-adjudicator types have no 
separation of functions, and about one-third of those types that preside 
over hearings in which an agency is a party also lack separation.265 
MAR 121 calls for the same separation of functions that applies to 
ALJs to govern all agency adjudicators.266 The official comments to 
MAR 121 note that the APA excludes certain agency adjudications 
from the prohibition: those addressing initial licensing and those 
concerning rates, facilities, or practices related to public carriers or 
utilities.267 
The separation of functions is especially important for non-ALJ 
adjudicators because, unlike ALJs, they are almost always subject to 
performance reviews268 and may receive performance bonuses from 
 262. ADMIN. CONF. U.S., MODEL ADJUDICATION RULE 120 (2018) [hereinafter MAR], 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Model%20Adjudication%20Rules%209.13.1 
8%20ACUS_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4HE-P7GR ]. 
 263. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 68 (discussing the nature of ex parte limitations 
for non-ALJ adjudicators). 
 264. Id. at 68 fig.25. 
 265. Id. at 61. 
 266. Compare MAR, supra note 262, at R. 121 (proposing that those doing investigative or 
prosecutorial work for the agency may not have any connection to adjudications or supervise the 
adjudicator), with 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (prohibiting employees from being supervised by someone in 
an investigative or prosecutorial role).
267. MAR, supra note 262, at R. 121 cmt. 2. 
 268. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 73 (noting that 99 percent of all 10,831 reported 
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their agencies.269 The Supreme Court, although it has indicated that 
combined functions alone do not offend due process,270 has also 
repeatedly looked askance at adjudicators having a financial interest in 
the litigation before them.271 An agency-party paying its adjudicators 
bonuses may not create a direct interest in the outcome of the 
litigation, but doing so can indirectly, yet meaningfully, influence an 
adjudicator if she thinks that the agency will be more generous when 
she favors the agency. Similarly, impartiality regulations could 
delineate the appropriate considerations in reviewing non-ALJ 
adjudicators and in awarding non-ALJ adjudicators bonuses to 
mitigate any appearance of partiality. 
Other matters may also be suitable for the impartiality 
regulations. For instance, ACUS has recommended that agencies 
adopt recusal processes and standards for agency adjudicators.272 
Likewise, creating physical separation between agency adjudicators 
and the rest of the agency may be a meaningful way of maintaining 
psychological separation.273 The larger point is that impartiality 
regulations can address not only a constitutional dilemma of the 
Supreme Court’s making but also other matters related to adjudicatory 
impartiality and fairness. 
C. Potential Concerns 
Impartiality regulations have drawbacks. They require resources, 
limit the responsibility that Congress and courts have in assuring that 
agency adjudication has legitimacy, and depend upon political will and 
long-sighted vision for good government. Each concern is addressed in 
turn below. 
 269. See id. at 77–78 (noting that 90 percent of all non-ALJ adjudicators are eligible for pay 
bonuses). 
 270. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 54 n.20 (1975) (noting that the agency’s internal 
separation of functions was not necessary to its holding that the particular sequence of functions 
at issue was constitutional). 
 271. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1982); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57, 60–62 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520, 535 (1927). 
272. Admin. Conf. U.S., Adoption of Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 2139, 2139–41 (Feb. 6, 
2019) (describing Recommendation 2018-4). 
 273. See Kristin E. Hickman, Symbolism and Separation of Powers in Agency Design, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1495–96 (2018) (discussing the use of physical separation in Canada 
to further separation of powers); Paul R. Verkuil, A Study of Informal Adjudication Procedures, 
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 739, 787 (1976) (considering the utility of separated physical space to 
encourage separation of adjudicators from others in the agency). For findings on the status of 
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1. The Costs of Regulating Impartiality. Impartiality regulations, 
of course, have costs. The entire executive branch will need to invest 
time in drafting and circulating the executive order and promulgating 
the regulations. Aside from promulgation itself, impartiality has its 
own costs. Merit-based hiring is more demanding than discretionary 
hiring because it limits the pool of suitable candidates and requires 
some evaluation of the candidates’ merit. The protection from at-will 
removal will render the removal of poorly performing adjudicators 
more onerous because of the required administrative process. 
Additional impartiality provisions may, in certain adjudications, slow 
down the hearing process by limiting ex parte contacts or limiting to 
whom the agency may assign adjudicatory roles.
Yet these costs are not as onerous as they may first appear. For 
instance, the promulgation costs are largely a one-time expenditure. 
Once drafted, any revisions to the order or regulations are likely to 
prove rare and be limited to only a handful of agencies because they 
address fundamental, structural matters related to adjudication, not 
fact-bound technical issues. 
The protections from at-will discipline or removal only slightly 
alter the status quo. For ALJs, nothing changes. For non-ALJ 
adjudicators, the only change is that now the MSPB makes the initial 
determination as to whether good cause exists. Notably, these changes 
do not alter the entire civil service—merely a small portion of it. 
Depending on how the order and regulations define their covered 
adjudicators, at most they could cover around ten thousand of the 2.1 
million federal employees,274 or less than one-half of a percent. 
Likewise, merit-based hiring is already required for the civil service— 
despite room for improvement275—and agencies are already in the 
process of creating merit-based hiring processes.276 
The additional hearing-related costs, such as ex parte prohibitions, 
will prove a more significant change to agency adjudication over the 
long term. But when weighing these benefits, two iterations of working 
groups that drafted ACUS’s MARs—comprised of scholars, agency 
officials, and agency adjudicators—have included the provisions 
 274. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43590, FEDERAL WORKFORCE STATISTICS SOURCES: OPM
AND OMB 1 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43590.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV3N-SJF5]. 
 275. See generally Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 85–89 (suggesting improvements to 
non-ALJ hiring). 
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mentioned here. In fact, ACUS itself has recommended that agencies 
implement many of these protections proposed here to promote 
impartiality,277 and many agencies have adopted certain protections.278 
In short, I would be far from the first to find that the benefits of 
provisions that improve the appearance of impartiality outweigh the 
costs. 
2. Shirking Congressional and Judicial Responsibility. One may be 
concerned that promulgating impartiality regulations lets courts and 
Congress off the hook by, respectively, giving them cover from the 
policy concerns of invalidating statutory provisions or failing to act to 
improve agency adjudication writ large. They may well do so. The 
impartiality regulations, to be clear, are a second-best response to my 
preferred outcome for the Court to bless the tiered protections from 
removal and for Congress to improve all adjudicators’ appearance of 
impartiality. Because recent doctrinal shifts indicate that the Court is 
unlikely to adopt a functional approach to the president’s removal 
power that accounts for due process concerns,279 the courts are unlikely 
to provide a solution. Likewise, Congress has proven fairly 
uninterested or ineffective in proactively protecting adjudicators. 
These branches’ failure to act leaves the executive as the last, best 
option to protect adjudicatory impartiality. 
But absent my preferred course, impartiality regulations can 
mitigate or moot judicial harm and serve as a replacement for 
congressional inaction. First, the impartiality regulations limit the 
ramifications of applying Free Enterprise Fund to adjudicators because 
the regulations, by replicating the statutory status quo, serve as a 
backstop. In fact, if agencies acted quickly to promulgate them before 
current judicial proceedings end, the regulations may moot any 
challenge because the Court’s judgment would not lead to a remedy 
that changes anything. The adjudicators would have the same or more 
protection from at-will removal even absent the current statutory 
regime. Second, the regulations also help create a better system for 
non-ALJ adjudicators, who significantly outnumber ALJs, even if 
Congress fails to act or cannot act after a party’s successful judicial 
 277. ADMIN. CONF. U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2016-4, at 1, 3–4 (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/informal-agency-adjudication-recommendation
-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/D49F-F7E5]. 
 278. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 60–84 (discussing the impartiality protections 
that agencies reported for non-ALJ adjudicators). 
 279. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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challenge based on Free Enterprise Fund. If Congress fails to or cannot 
address the issue, the regulations simply have the executive branch to 
do what it has historically done—regulate its own workforce. 
An executive response does permit the other branches to avoid 
responsibility for a problem of their own making. But the executive has 
its own responsibility. It, no less than the other branches, should share 
the political accountability in creating and maintaining a legitimate 
bureaucracy. After all, as the executive’s history of protecting the civil 
service indicates, the executive has the necessary tools to improve the 
federal bureaucracy. If the executive refrained from acting out of fear 
of shouldering the other branches’ responsibilities, the executive would 
eschew its own duty. 
3. The Necessity of Political Will. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly in the near term, will the executive branch have any 
appetite for impartiality regulations? The inertia of and largely 
unlimited agency discretion under the current system may lead the 
executive branch to resist change. Given the Trump administration’s 
views on removing ALJs as presented in Lucia and its aftermath, 
change would likely have to await an election, whether for a more 
receptive administration or as a lame-duck measure by an 
administration on its way out the door that is hostile to the incoming 
administration. But even new administrations of either major political 
party might see an advantage in being able to control adjudicators in 
matters that are important to them. For instance, conservatives may 
prefer to control immigration judges, while progressives may prefer to 
control adjudicators who preside over business-related enforcement 
proceedings. Or administrations of one political party may seek to 
establish impartial adjudicators only to have the administrations of the 
other political party undo the impartiality regulations to benefit its 
objectives. In other words, the “virtuous” party would lose policy 
battles to the “nonvirtuous” party—an untenable political position.
All of these concerns highlight an underlying imperative of my 
proposal: administrations of both major political parties must 
appreciate the long-term benefits that impartiality provides, and they 
must allow those benefits to outweigh their short-term partisan 
interests. Of course, impartiality can hinder an administration’s short-
term policy goals. But unfettered control comes at a cost if meta policy 
goals are mistaken for policy applications in the course of an 
adjudication. For adjudications to have moral force they must apply, 
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force benefits everyone involved in adjudication by treating affected 
parties fairly, thus lending legitimacy to the process that, over time, can 
develop an agency’s policy preferences. My hope is that this Article, 
past ACUS recommendations and MARs, and increased scholarly 
attention to adjudication will help provide the catalyst for agencies, 
policymakers, and regulated entities to focus on and articulate these 
benefits as part of improving agency adjudication. 
If the executive branch has concerns over ceding significant 
control to impartial adjudicators, those fears are misplaced.280 Agencies 
have numerous basic, well-known tools for controlling policy and the 
legal principles that guide even impartial adjudicators: interpretive 
rules, substantive rules, policy statements, procedural rules, and 
influence on congressional statutory drafting. Indeed, these 
mechanisms provide more effective policy control because they apply 
to all relevant cases. The agency need not monitor individual 
adjudicators. And at any rate, brute policy implementation is not the 
only value that executive action should consider. Reasoned, open-
minded decision-making, protection of regulated parties’ dignity 
interests, and decisions that inspire confidence in the public are all 
important aspects of good governance. 
If my confidence in grand notions of good government and long-
term interests of different actors seems naïve, I leave with you one 
reminder: The federal government encountered significant concerns 
over the impartiality of agency adjudicators during the New Deal.281 
Congress and President Truman responded by giving ALJs—the 
agency adjudicators whom they expected to preside over nearly all 
evidentiary hearings282—significant indicia of impartiality in the APA. 
To be sure, the action was in the form of statutory law, not executive 
action. But the APA provisions on impartiality came from the Franklin 
280. Agencies do not always seek to control policy. For example, prior to the APA, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) gave its examiners near-total independence in certain 
matters, at least until the ICC’s administrative appellate review: “No one in the Commission has 
power to substitute his judgment for that of the examiner in the preparation of the proposed 
report. If the examiner chooses to depart from all the precedents established by Commission 
decisions, he is free to do so and no one can stop him.” 2 DAVIS, supra note 222, § 10.01, at 2 
(quotations omitted). But for certain other matters, the ICC reviewed the examiner’s report 
before its issuance. See id. (describing ICC review of reorganization orders). 
 281. See Daniel J. Gifford, Federal Administrative Law Judges: The Relevance of Past Choices 
to Future Directions, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 6–8, 44 (1997) (discussing concerns over hearing 
examiners’ combination of functions and bias).
 282. See Barnett & Wheeler, supra note 38, at 15 (citing APA legislative history and the 
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D. Roosevelt administration’s recommendations.283 The broader point 
is that our political system has recognized and addressed concerns over 
agency adjudicators’ impartiality. And it can do so again. 
CONCLUSION
The executive is not helpless to address the agency-adjudicator 
dilemma. Congress does not have to be the one to sheathe the 
Damocles Sword of at-will removal. The executive branch can find the 
scabbard all by itself. In fact, the executive can demonstrate its own 
power by voluntarily taking action, instead of demonstrating its 
weakness by having one of the other branches do so over the 
executive’s objection. As this Article has indicated, the executive had 
long done so. This Article attempts to remind agencies that they have 
the power by themselves to limit the fallout from the constitutional 
competition between due process and Article II if the courts and 
Congress will not or cannot do so.
Perhaps even more importantly, the history of executive action in 
insulating certain officials demonstrates that the executive can act. The 
political responsibility falls not just on Congress but on the executive 
branch. The president cannot simply say that Congress or judicial 
doctrine ties his hands. Insulating or not insulating adjudicators is a 
political choice—a choice within the executive’s discretion. 
From a broader perspective, internal administrative law for 
adjudicatory independence brings needed and beneficial uniformity to 
federal agency adjudication. Professor Emily Bremer has persuasively 
argued that, contrary to the strong pull of uniformity for agency 
rulemaking and judicial review of agency action, “the governing norm 
in adjudication is exceptionalism.”284 Although exceptionalism may 
permit useful tailoring and efficiency, it has significant transparency 
costs and precludes the entrenchment and stability of norms across 
agencies.285 Because of its binary quality and the need for prophylactic 
action, impartiality is an especially suitable candidate for uniform 
treatment. The impartiality regulations here nudge agencies toward 
 283. See Gifford, supra note 281, at 7 (describing the history leading up to the APA’s 
codification). Echoing the importance of recognizing good governance, the House Report for the 
APA expected “self-interest and due concern for the proper performance of public functions” to 
lead agencies to hire well-qualified adjudicators. H. REP. NO. 1980 (1946), reprinted in APALEG.
HISTORY, supra note 52, at 280. 
 284. Emily Bremer, The Exceptionalism Norm in Administrative Adjudication, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 1351, 1410. 
 285. See id. at 1413–16. 
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uniformity, while giving some space for agency tailoring where 
necessary.286 The executive need not await a congressional or judicial 
catalyst to provide useful uniformity, mitigate a constitutional 
conundrum, or improve the public’s confidence in executive decision-
making. 
286. Kenneth Culp Davis argued more than sixty years ago that “[t]he goal should be 
elimination of needless diversity, not the achievement of uniformity.” 1 DAVIS, supra note 222, 
§ 8.02, at 520. 
